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ABSTRACT
Policymakers at the state and local level are increasingly interested in using
market-based pricing mechanisms as regulatory tools. For example, at the state
level, several states have recently considered state-level carbon pricing, while at
the local level, municipal governments are increasingly turning to stormwater
remediation fees to pay for the treatment of municipal runoff required by the
Clean Water Act.
These regulatory programs are inspired by the insight of English economist
Arthur Pigou, who suggested governments could price social costs into market
transactions by imposing a tax. Such policies, however, are frequently subject
to state court litigation challenging them as unlawful taxes. State law restricts
both state and local governments’ ability to enact taxes, but similar restrictions
are often not in place to limit the enactment of regulatory actions or user fees.
Unfortunately, state courts have struggled to appropriately classify these fees
under existing state law doctrines.
Such legal instability makes state and local governments less likely to adopt
such policies, even when there are strong arguments for doing so. This Article
takes a critical look at current state law governing the distinction between user
fees and taxes. This Article then argues that Pigovian levies do not fit neatly
into either legal category under the definitions in place in most states. As a
result, this Article proposes reforms to state user fee definitions that would
bring needed clarity to user fee doctrine. Specifically, this Article suggests state
courts recognize separate categories of user fees. One such category, price-based
regulatory tools, would allow governments to impose Pigovian charges as user
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fees so long as the charge was roughly commensurate with the externality costs
or with the governments’ expenses in abating the externality.
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I. INTRODUCTION
State and local lawmakers are increasingly experimenting with
regulations that seek to change behavior through market mecha-
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nisms.1 In other words, governments are attempting to increase the
price for engaging in behaviors that they want to discourage and
charge people for the ways their behavior contributes to shared
problems. At the same time, governments are also increasingly look-
ing for non-tax revenue.2
As such policies become more commonplace, state courts increas-
ingly struggle to characterize these policies under existing state law.
Stormwater remediation fees, put in place to allow municipal sewage
systems to meet Clean Water Act standards, have been repeatedly
challenged as illegal taxes.3 In Missouri and Michigan, state courts
have struck down such fees, leaving local governments with signifi-
cant infrastructure costs and limited financing options.4 Ongoing liti-
gation challenges California’s carbon auction as an illegal tax under
California law.5 Philadelphia’s soda tax recently survived a challenge
claiming that it conflicted with Pennsylvania’s sales tax.6 This legal
instability makes state and local governments less likely to adopt such
policies, even when there are strong arguments for doing so.
Whether such charges are treated as taxes or user fees depends on
state law tests constructed to deal with more traditional types of fees
and taxes.7 I will provide more detail on how states define the differ-
ence between taxes and user fees later in this Article, but for now,
some simple examples will help illustrate these two categories. Prop-
erty taxes, like income taxes and sales taxes, are treated—unsurpris-
ingly—as taxes. Business or occupation licensing charges measured
by gross receipts are also treated like taxes. However, flat business or
1. See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Toward a Pigouvian State, 164 U. PA.
L. REV. 93, 93–98 (2015); Victor Fleischer, Curb Your Enthusiasm for Pigovian
Taxes, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1673, 1676 (2015).
2. Economists often call such policies “Pigovian taxes,” inspired by the insights of
British economist Arthur Pigou. A century ago, Pigou commented on the poten-
tial efficiency gains of taxing “externalities”—the costs that a market transaction
imposes on third parties. N. GREGORY MANKIW, ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMICS 203
(Jack W. Calhoun et al. eds., 6th ed. 2012). The classic example of a Pigovian tax
is an emissions tax, which charges polluters for the costs their emissions impose
on society as a whole. However, a range of other state and local policies, ranging
from soda taxes to fees imposed to pay for municipal Clean Water Act compliance,
have Pigovian elements.
3. See infra section III.B.
4. See Bolt v. City of Lansing, 587 N.W.2d 264, 266 (Mich. 1998) (finding
stormwater user charge was a tax and not a fee); Zweig v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer
Dist., 412 S.W.3d 223, 248–49 (Mo. 2013) (finding stormwater user charge was a
tax rather than a fee). But see, e.g., Teter v. Clark County, 704 P.2d 1171, 1181
(Wash. 1985) (upholding stormwater charge as a fee).
5. Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. State Air Res. Bd., 216 Cal. Rptr. 3d 694, 700 (Ct.
App. 2017) (holding that the carbon auction was not a tax and thus did not violate
Proposition 13’s supermajority requirement).
6. Williams v. City of Phila., 164 A.3d 576, 583 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017) (holding that
the beverage tax was not duplicative of the current sales tax).
7. See infra section II.C.
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licensing charges levied to recoup the cost of regulating a specific in-
dustry are treated as fees, as are charges a government collects to pay
for water usage, trash collection, and other municipally-provided ser-
vices. Traditionally, user fees are payments for benefits (either goods
or services) provided by a government.
Many charges do not fit neatly into either category. For example, a
toll is traditionally thought of as a user fee. Paying a toll confers a
benefit: the right to use a particular roadway. However, technology
increasingly allows for variable pricing in tolls. Variable pricing
“charg[es] the customer based on how much he or she values the ser-
vice, instead of the cost to provide the service.”8 Such a pricing model
may allow governments to generate revenue for “general transporta-
tion needs and a range of other benefits,” and if the revenue serves
this greater purpose, a toll can be converted to a tax.9
In many states, stormwater remediation fees are treated as user
fees just like any other sewer-related charge; in Missouri and Michi-
gan, such charges are taxes.10 These legal classifications matter for a
number of reasons. In many states, there are procedural hurdles for
imposing taxes that do not apply to user fees11 and in most states,
local governments have less authority to impose taxes than user
fees.12
In many cases, courts will treat regulatory pricing as a tax, not a
user fee.13 This is true for several reasons. First, the benefit the payor
8. URBAN LAND INST. WHEN THE ROAD PRICE IS RIGHT 5 (2013), uli.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/03/When-the-Road-Price-is-Right_web_F.pdf [https://perma.unl
.edu/UZR7-H8YR].
9. Id. at 6.
10. See Vandergriff v. City of Chattanooga, 44 F. Supp. 2d 927, 941 (E.D. Tenn. 1998)
(upholding fee); Church of Peace v. City of Rock Island, 828 N.E.2d 1282, 1286
(Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (upholding fee); McCleod v. Columbia County, 599 S.E.2d 152,
156 (Ga. 2004) (upholding fee); Bolt v. City of Lansing, 587 N.W.2d 264, 266
(Mich. 1998) (finding stormwater user charge was a tax and not a fee); Zweig v.
Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 412 S.W.3d 223, 248–49 (Mo. 2013) (finding
stormwater user charge was a tax rather than a fee); State v. City of Charleston,
513 S.E.2d 97, 97 (S.C. 1999) (upholding fee); Smith v. Spokane County, 948 P.2d
1301, 1312 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding fee); Substitute Brief of the Nat’l
Assoc. of Clean Water Agencies, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant-
Appellant/Cross-Respondent the Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist. at 13, Zweig v.
Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 412 S.W.3d 223 (Mo. 2013) (No. SC92581), 2012 WL
7861293, at *12 (“However, the majority trend is for the state appellate courts to
find charges like MSD’s to be a fee and not a tax.”).
11. See infra Part III.
12. Erin Adele Scharff, Powerful Cities?: Limits on Municipal Taxing Authority and
What to Do About Them, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 292, 296 (2016).
13. For example, in most jurisdictions, plastic bag fees have been enacted under the
jurisdiction’s taxing authority. See e.g., Assemb. B. A08479A, 2015 Gen. Assemb.,
238th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015) (“An Act to amend the tax law, in relation to impos-
ing a tax on plastic and paper shopping bags . . . .”). Similarly, most carbon pric-
ing proposals are proposed under the taxing authority. See infra section III.B.
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receives is not a typical user fee benefit. Rather, the benefit conferred
could be characterized as the ability to harm a public good. Think
about garbage fees: if a garbage fee just reimburses a government for
providing trash hauling and disposal, it is clearly a user fee. The gov-
ernment provides a waste management benefit. However, if the gov-
ernment seeks to recover not just the direct costs of garbage disposal
but also the indirect costs of trash collection (land contamination or
emissions from garbage incineration), these are costs not borne di-
rectly by the person who created the trash or the government hauling
it away. Rather,  society as a whole bears the costs of this kind of gar-
bage-based pollution. If we are to say that the government is charging
the user for a benefit, it is for the license to create these problems.
Second, the relationship between the size of the benefit to the user
and the cost of providing the benefit (or allowing the harmful behav-
ior) is more complicated than that of a typical user fee. In the classic
user fee context, the user fee charged reflects dollars that a govern-
ment spends directly. In the regulatory context, however, the govern-
ment may not bear the cost of the harm directly. For example, a driver
who adds traffic congestion harms other drivers, but the government
does not incur any direct additional costs by virtue of that conges-
tion.14 (Of course, there may be indirect costs if congestion leads local
residents to advocate additional lanes and other roadway
improvements.)
This Article discusses how courts determine—and how courts
should determine—whether a charge is a user fee or a tax. I argue,
first, that courts should be more precise in recognizing the diversity of
government charges encompassed by the user fee doctrine. Second, I
argue that state courts, consistent with their interpretive authority,
should include in the definition of user fees those charges that are lev-
ied to offset the costs expended by a government in combatting an ex-
ternality or levied directly in proportion to the estimated costs of an
externality.
This argument proceeds in the following parts. Part II explores
current state law frameworks governing the distinction between taxes
and user fees. Part III provides a brief primer on Pigovian taxation
and considers how current frameworks treat various Pigovian policies.
Part IV offers suggestions for reforming the current frameworks. Part
V concludes.
14. Scharff, supra note 12, at 318–20.
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II. USER FEES V. TAXES
The popularity of regulatory pricing at the state and local level
should not be surprising.15 State and local governments rely on a
more diverse set of revenue sources than the federal government,
which is heavily reliant on income taxes.16 While sales and income
taxes are still the primary source of revenue at the state level and
property taxes are the primary type of revenue at the local level,17
reliance on user fees has increased at both levels over the past three
decades.18 This trend seems likely to continue.19 Further, many spe-
cial districts (the numerical majority of local governments) are funded
largely or exclusively by user fees.20
To some degree, this differentiation is consistent with the recom-
mendations of economists, particularly those economists focused on
the problem of tax assignment: how government at different levels
should raise revenue and which level of government should tax what
activities.21 Because opportunities for exit are greater the smaller the
jurisdiction, sub-federal entities should avoid taxing more mobile
items (like income).22 Thus, the tax assignment literature often rec-
ommends local governments raise revenue by taxing land, an immo-
bile asset.
15. In their article on Pigovian taxes, Eric Posner and Jonathan Masur note that
much of the action on Pigovian taxation has happened at the state and local level.
See generally Masur & Posner, supra note 1. Victor Fleischer’s survey of Pigovian
policies accords with this view. Fleischer, supra note 1. Fleischer is skeptical that
Pigovian theory can justify many non-carbon pricing models because of the signif-
icant heterogeneity in externalities. As I discuss in subsection IV.C.4, measuring
externalities accurately may be a difficulty with my proposal, but I am willing to
entertain pricing that allows either for some targeting or some imperfections in
modeling.
16. Ellen Kant & Liz Malm, The Sources of State and Local Tax Revenues, TAX
FOUND. (Jan. 28, 2013), http://taxfoundation.org/article/sources-state-and-local-
tax-revenues [https://perma.unl.edu/ZVV9-GLHC].
17. Id. Revenue here means own-source revenue, i.e. the revenue a government
raises by imposing its own taxes rather than revenue received through in-
tergovernment transfers.
18. Kriston Capps, Why City Fees Keep Rising Instead of Taxes, CITYLAB (June 4,
2015), http://www.citylab.com/work/2015/06/why-city-fees-keep-rising-instead-of-
taxes/394844/ [https://perma.unl.edu/R7ZG-FJD7].
19. Mike Maciag, The Current State of State Budgets, GOVERNING (June 16, 2014),
http://www.governing.com/topics/finance/gov-nasbo-state-budget-report.html
[https://perma.unl.edu/PGK2-E58G].
20. See infra subsection III.A.2 (discussing revenue raised by the Bay Area Air Man-
agement Quality District).
21. Charles E. McLure Jr., The Tax Assignment Problem: Ruminations on How The-
ory and Practice Depend on History, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 339, 339 (2001).
22. Richard M. Bird, Fiscal Federalism, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION AND TAX
POLICY 147, 147 (Joseph J. Cordes et al. eds., 2005) (discussing the different roles
for federal government compared with state and local government in taxation).
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More broadly, the tax assignment and fiscal federalism literatures
are skeptical about local efforts to implement progressive revenue or
spending programs, fearing the richest residents will simply leave the
jurisdiction.23 Under the classic Tiebout model—describing local gov-
ernment decisions to raise and spend revenue—the ease of exit allows
local residents to preference-sort based on the package of taxes and
local benefits they prefer.24
Despite the many persuasive critiques of the model,25 Tiebout’s ba-
sic insights continue to inform the way scholars think about local reve-
nue and spending decisions. As a result, even as the public and
scholars generally support a federal tax burden that reflects taxpay-
ers’ ability-to-pay, there is theoretical support at the local level for a
tax system that reflects the benefits theory of taxation.26 Under the
benefits theory, tax payments should reflect the benefits (goods or ser-
vices) that a particular level of government provides. This is in con-
trast to the federal and state income tax systems, which focus on
ability-to-pay as the criterion of tax fairness.27 User fees, which are
charged for benefits conferred, are obviously consistent with this bene-
fits theory. As a result, user fees may allocate government services
more efficiently than general revenue taxation. As Clayton Gillette
and Thomas Hopkins have observed, “there are many situations in
which a user fee can successfully ration limited supplies of currently
available goods and services to more highly valued uses, signal
whether particular output levels should increase or decrease, avert
wasteful usage, and encourage use of more suitable substitutes.”28
Of course, local governments are increasing their reliance on user
fees for reasons other than economic efficiency. First, numerous stud-
ies suggest that the tighter the connection between government bene-
fits and government revenue, the easier it is for governments to raise
revenue.29 In this context, governments may find that user fees are
23. Id.
24. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956).
25. See Gladriel Shobe, Disaggregating the State and Local Tax Deduction, 35 VA.
TAX REV. 327, 361–62 (2016) (summarizing some of the “extreme” assumptions of
the Tiebout model).
26. Darien Shanske, Interpreting State Fiscal Constitutions: A Modest Proposal, 69
RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1331 (2018). Shanske’s paper addresses the important ques-
tion of how a court should evaluate a fee structure. As he notes, by setting a
charge too high, a government can convert a user fee into a tax. Id. at 1331. But
how does a court know whether the fee is set too high? Shankse argues courts
should evaluate such fee setting procedurally rather than substantively. Id. at
1335.
27. AJAY K. MEHROTRA, MAKING THE MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL STATE (2013).
28. Clayton P. Gillette & Thomas D. Hopkins, Federal User Fees: A Legal and Eco-
nomic Analysis, 67 B.U. L. Rev. 795, 805 (1987).
29. See Shobe, supra note 25, at 25–26 (reviewing such studies).
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simply more popular than taxes. Second, many states now subject tax
increases to supermajority requirements and other procedural hur-
dles. For example, California’s Proposition 13, the grandfather of con-
temporary tax limitation measures, requires a two-thirds majority for
tax increases.30 Such limitations have made raising taxes more diffi-
cult at the local level, and local governments have sought to substitute
fees for tax revenue.31 Third, some of the increased reliance on user
fees stems from the increased use of services traditionally associated
with user fees, like public hospitals and universities.32
In this section, I first provide some background on how states and
local governments currently use their user fee authority. I then ex-
plore what is at stake in the distinction between user fees and taxes.
Finally, I look at judicial efforts to distinguish taxes from user fees.
A. The Variety of User Fees
Most tax revenue is from a few major sources: income, sales, and
property taxes.33 The term “fee,” however, describes a wide variety of
exactions, ranging from library fines and municipal court fees to mu-
nicipal water bills and public recreation fees. State law definitions of
user fees, however, do not always craft distinctions between these dif-
ferent types of fees. Thus, the Massachusetts Supreme Court consid-
30. See, e.g., STATE OF WIS. LEGIS. AUDIT BUREAU BEST PRACTICES REPORT: LOCAL
GOV’T USER FEES, LEG. 96, 9–11 (2004), http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lab/reports/04-
0userfeesfull.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/89CR-QSGU] (discussing the ability of
Wisconsin municipalities to impose user fees more easily than taxes). At the local
level, the benefits principle of taxation (i.e., the idea that taxes represent a pay-
ment by a resident for a bundle of public goods) plays a much greater role in
policy design than it does at the state and federal levels, where the “ability to
pay” principle has generally carried the day. See JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA,
TAXING OURSELVES 227–29 (4th ed. 2008) (providing overview of both theories);
see also MEHROTRA, supra note 27, at 193–96 (providing a historical account of
rise of the “ability to pay” principle at state and federal levels). Nevertheless,
many scholars have criticized increasing reliance on user fees as taking the bene-
fits principle too far. See Suellen M. Wolfe, Municipal Finance and the Commerce
Clause: Are User Fees the Next Target of the “Silver Bullet”?, 26 STETSON L. REV.
727, 785 (1997) (expressing concern that user fees may be targeted for constitu-
tional scrutiny).
31. It is less clear if support for tax increases has changed over time. While certainly
all else equal, voters would prefer lower taxes, “voters are as likely as not to vote
for a state tax increase.” VANESSA S. WILLIAMSON, READ MY LIPS: WHY AMERICANS
ARE PROUD TO PAY TAXES xiii (2017).
32. Dick Netzner, Differences in Reliance on User Charges by American State and
Local Governments, 20 PUB. FIN. Q. 499, 503 (1992).
33. The federal government and state and local governments also raise some revenue
via excise taxes. Excise taxes are paid on purchases of a certain good or on a
certain activity, generally included in the price of the good. A common example is
gasoline. See generally Excise Tax, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/
businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/excise-tax [https://perma.unl.edu/
XQ2L-DKN5] (last updated Nov. 20, 2017).
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ers both the payments required of sex offenders to the state’s sex
offender registry and tolls paid by drivers on the Massachusetts Turn-
pike under similar doctrinal tests.34
In considering Washington State’s definition of a user fee, Hugh
Spitzer has suggested four categories of user fees: (1) commodity
charges, (2) burden offset charges, (3) regulatory fees, and (4) special
assessments.35
Commodity charges comprise the classic type of user fees. As
Spitzer observes, these fees are “[i]mposed to pay for the provision of
commodities or services of direct benefit to consumer[s],”36 such as
utilities or tickets to a municipal museum.37 Such fees are calculated
by considering both marginal costs of providing the service and the
capital costs that need to be recouped from consumers.38 To the extent
the municipality offers a private good in a competitive market place,
governments may sometimes use private market pricing as a
benchmark.39
Regulatory fees are assessed to recoup the cost of administering
regulations.40 Fees charged by state licensing boards are typically reg-
ulatory fees, designed to recoup the cost of regulating the licensed in-
dustry. Similarly, fees charged by a municipal department to inspect
residential buildings for code compliance are regulatory fees. These
fees are designed to recover the cost of code enforcement. While these
fees partly benefit the payor, they also benefit the entire community
by ensuring that a business is properly regulated.41
State courts rarely acknowledge the ways regulatory fees differ in
purpose from commodity fees. Instead, they focus on the relationship
34. Compare Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 947 N.E.2d 9, 19 (Mass. 2011) (stat-
ing that regulatory fees are set to cover costs of participating in regulation), with
Murphy v. Mass. Tpk. Auth., 971 N.E.2d 231, 239–40 (Mass. 2012) (allowing toll
fees to pay for improvements on roads other than the ones producing revenue). As
discussed in section II.C, the Massachusetts Supreme Court does tweak the re-
quirements of voluntariness for “regulatory fees”—a category that includes the
sex offender registry registration fee.
35. Hugh D. Spitzer, Taxes vs. Fees: A Curious Confusion, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 335, 364
(2003). Spitzer’s insightful work explores the tax versus fee distinction under
Washington state law and likewise concludes that courts would benefit by explic-
itly recognizing multiple types of user fees.
36. Id.
37. See generally 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.344(f) (2008); 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 25.451 (2008).
38. See Spitzer, supra note 35, at 345. Darien Shankse’s recent work explores the
complexities of these calculations. As he observes, “No fee is perfect; they are only
average prices and not perfectly calibrated to the user.” Shankse, supra note 26,
at 1340.
39. Spitzer, supra note 35, at 364.
40. Id.
41. See Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 28, at 815–16 (discussing the pricing of user
fees when benefits accrue to nonpayers).
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between the charge paid by the business and the regulation, and they
focus on enforcement costs the government bears as a result of its
activities.
Special assessments are another kind of user fee. These assess-
ments are typically levied on property and are thought to pay for the
capital costs of public infrastructure that increase property value.42
Property law scholars have paid particular attention to such fees, es-
pecially development impact fees, which have been the subject of sev-
eral Supreme Court challenges. Development impact fees charge
developers for public costs associated with developing land (like in-
creased infrastructure and public school costs), and they condition
permit approval on paying such fees. Developers challenged these fees
as unlawful takings, arguing that they impose restrictions on private
land use in violation of due process. In those cases, the Supreme Court
has held that rough proportionality must be found between the pay-
ment required and the benefit to the property owner.43
Pigovian charges differ from development impact fees in several
ways. First, they are not charges collected as part of a permit approval
process. Second, they are often levied based on activity level rather
than as an incident of property ownership and development.44 Third,
and finally, the Takings Clause jurisprudence on impact fees looks at
the relationship between the benefit government services provide to
the property owner and the costs that the government incurs as a re-
sult of development.45 Pigovian charges, on the other hand, are levied
in relationship to the harm the payor causes the public.
Spitzer’s fourth category of user fees overlaps with Pigovian
charges. Spitzer terms this subset of user fees “burden offset charges,”
which he defines as payments to cover the cost of externalities im-
posed by the payor’s activities.46 Spitzer cites sewer rates, garbage
rates, and stormwater remediation fees as examples of these burden-
offset charges, which, at least under Washington law, could be consid-
ered user fees.47 He does not, however, analyze pollution taxes. Nor is
it clear that sewer and garbage rates are payments for externalities.
42. See Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the “Get What You Pay
For” Model of Local Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 373, 397 (2004).
43. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
44. 7 NORMAN WILLIAM JR. & JOHN M. TAYLOR, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW
§ 167:1, at 530 (Rev. ed. 2003) (describing the trend of localities to “raise revenue
by imposing fees upon new development, with the fee usually being due and pay-
able at the time of building permit issuance”).
45. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (“No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the
city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedi-
cation is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed
development.”).
46. See Spitzer, supra note 35, at 364.
47. Id.
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Payors certainly benefit directly from having their trash removed
from their property and their sewage treated far away from their
property.
Further, while state courts have not limited the category of user
fees to fees paid for the direct consumption of government services,
most state courts have done so by stretching the definition of a “bene-
fit” rather than directly grappling with how to categorize government
pricing of externalities.48 As a result, state law in this area remains
unsettled and unpredictable.
Spitzer suggests that Washington’s user fee doctrine would be
more coherent if its state courts recognized the multiplicity of user
fees that governments impose.49 Spitzer’s critique, however, applies
more broadly. While some states have crafted more specialized tests
for special assessments (or, more limitedly, impact fees), state law
often fails to distinguish between benefit fees, regulatory fees, and
burden offset charges when evaluating whether a particular extrac-
tion is a “fee” or a “tax.” Before turning to the doctrine, it is useful to
spend some time thinking about the differences between fees and
taxes.
B. Legal Differences Between Taxes and User Fees
A state court might be called upon to classify a given policy as a tax
or a user fee for a number of reasons. First, state courts may need to
determine whether an extraction was subject to state political process
requirements (such as supermajority approval) that affect taxes but
not user fees. Second, a state court may be called upon to determine
whether a local government extraction is a valid user fee or an invalid
tax. Third, state courts may be asked to evaluate whether an extrac-
tion is subject to state constitutional requirements of equal apportion-
ment not applicable to user fees. Fourth, a tax-exempt entity may try
to claim a tax exemption, and the government may counter that the
entity is not exempt because the levy is a user fee. Finally, under the
Tax Injunction Act (and its variants) as well as sovereign immunity
doctrines, federal courts sometimes need to distinguish taxes from
fees. While my argument focuses on state law definitions of these
terms, federal law has influenced a number of state interpretations.
Consequently, I briefly touch upon selected federal cases at the end of
this section.
48. See, e.g., subsection III.B.2 (discussing the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in
Bolt v. City of Lansing, 587 N.W.2d 264 (Mich. 1998), holding that Lansing’s
stormwater remediation fees were taxes rather than fees).
49. Id.
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1. Political Process Restrictions
Fee payors often challenge government extractions as “hidden” or
“disguised” taxes. Payors argue these taxes are invalid because they
are put in place without the various political process requirements
that circumscribe the enactment of new taxes or the increase of ex-
isting taxes. Some states require supermajorities to increase taxes, at
least in some instances.50 Other states require voter approval through
a referendum process, at least at the local level.51
While some states enacted tax restrictions in the nineteenth cen-
tury, passage of such restrictions accelerated in the later part of the
twentieth century.52 Of the  forty-six states with tax restrictions, sev-
enteen added restrictions between 1970 and 1976, and “nearly half
(48%) of those currently in existence were adopted after 1977.”53
Michigan’s Headlee Amendment imposed overall limits on state tax
collection and required voter approval for new local taxes,54 while
Missouri’s Hancock Amendment requires voter approval for both state
and local tax increases.55
Perhaps the best-known of these taxing restrictions is California’s
Proposition 13.56 Proposition 13 focused on limiting California’s prop-
erty taxes, reducing the property tax rate to one percent, and limiting
the rate at which property tax assessments could grow to two percent
50. Policy Basics: State Supermajority Rules to Raise Revenue, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POL’Y PRIORITIES, http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/PolicyBasics-
StateSupermajorities-4-22-13.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/PR32-2ZXR] (last up-
dated Feb. 5, 2018).
51. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20.
52. Daniel R. Mullins & Bruce A. Wallin, Tax and Expenditure Limitations: Introduc-
tion and Overview, 24 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 2, 3–6 (2004).
53. Id. at 6; see also Stephen Diamond, The Death and Transfiguration of Benefit
Taxation: Special Assessments in Nineteenth-Century America, 12 J. LEGAL STUD.
201, 268 n.160 (1983) (discussing limits on special assessment both by frequency
and in relation to property value).
54. Kevin C. Kennedy, The First Twenty Years of the Headlee Amendment, 76 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 1031, 1031–33 (1999).
55. Rhonda C. Thomas, The Hancock Amendment: The Limits Imposed on Local Gov-
ernments, 52 UMKC L. REV. 22, 22 (1983).
56. See ARTHUR O’SULLIVAN ET AL., PROPERTY TAXES AND TAX REVOLTS: THE LEGACY
OF PROPOSITION 13, at 6 (1995) (exploring how Proposition 13 radically reduced
the ability of local governments to set property tax rates within their district);
Michael R. Johnson et al., State Constitutional Tax Limitations: The Colorado
and California Experiences, 35 URB. LAW. 817, 817 (2003) (discussing implica-
tions of restrictions on local government’s ability to tax, specifically in regards to
Colorado’s TABOR and California’s Proposition 13); Policy Basics: Taxpayer Bill
of Rights (TABOR), CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, http://www.cbpp.org/
cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=2521 [https://perma.unl.edu/B5YS-ND34] (last up-
dated Aug. 13, 2015) (defining TABOR as constitutional Taxpayer Bill of Rights
measure meant to tie growth of state and local revenues to inflation rate and
population change of state).
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annually until the property owner sells the property.57 Proposition 13
also added a new restriction that affected all state taxes and special
purpose local taxes: a supermajority requirement.58 Special purpose
local taxes require approval from two-thirds of voters, while state tax
increases require a two-thirds majority of both the California Assem-
bly and Senate.59
All told, sixteen states have supermajority requirements,60 and an
additional three states require voter approval for tax increases.61
2. Restrictions on Local Taxing Authority
Fee payors also challenge user fees imposed by local governments
as invalid taxes under state law. In the vast majority of states, local
governments have greater authority to impose user fees than taxes.62
Traditionally, states have granted local governments very limited rev-
enue-generating authority, even as compared to other home rule
powers.63
While some jurisdictions, like California and Ohio, grant taxing
authority to charter or home rule jurisdictions, many states do not.64
As a result, cities may lack authority to enact meaningful tax reform,
including reform to the most important local tax, the property tax. In
New Orleans, elected officials had to win a state constitutional amend-
ment simply to allow its residents to vote on their own property tax
increases. In Texas, mayors worry that proposed state-level cuts to
57. What is Proposition 13?, CAL. TAX DATA, http://www.californiataxdata.com/pdf/
Prop13.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/A2FL-VCGE].
58. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 3(a).
59. Noah Glyn & Scott Drenkard, Prop 13 in California, 35 Years Later, TAX FOUND.
(June 6, 2013), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/prop-13-california-35-years-later
[https://perma.unl.edu/A9B7-AZ4J]. As will be discussed in the next section, sub-
sequent ballot initiatives expanded the supermajority requirements at the local
level and minimized some of the differences between taxes and user fees, thus
expanding the scope of Proposition 13. Most recently, California voters elimi-
nated the supermajority requirement at the state level.
60. Bert Waisanen, State Tax and Expenditure Limits—2010, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS-
LATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/state-tax-and-expenditure-
limits-2010.aspx#typesoflimts [https://perma.unl.edu/7SAA-FT5N].
61. Id.
62. DALE KRANE, PLATON N. RIGOS & MELVIN B. HILL, HOME RULE IN AMERICA (2001).
63. See Richard Briffault, Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits
and State Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 915 (2003) (“The vast major-
ity of state constitutions impose some limitation on the ability of their state and
local governments to incur debt.”).
64. See OHIO CONST. art XVIII, § 3 (Home Rule Amendment); CAL. GOV’T CODE
§ 23027 (West 2003) (uniform application of special taxes); CAL. GOV’T CODE
§ 37100.5 (West 2003) (voter approval of city levies); Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. v.
City of Cincinnati, 693 N.E.2d 212, 214 (Ohio 1998) (giving taxation authority to
locality); Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of Los Angeles, 812 P.2d 916, 924
(Cal. 1991) (finding taxation to be rightly within the power of the locality).
2018] GREEN FEES 181
their property tax rates will hinder their ability to provide municipal
services.65
But property taxation is not the only area where state authority
has blocked municipal tax reform. The New York State Legislature
blocked both of New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s efforts to
establish a congestion pricing system and stalled Mayor Bill de
Blasio’s proposed municipal income tax reforms.66 When Brookfield,
Illinois, tried to impose a tax on amusement activities, the Brookfield
Zoo lobbied the state legislature to prohibit the tax.67
In contrast, local governments have more expansive authority to
impose user fees.68 State law has long construed user fees as an exer-
cise of the local government’s general police power, which is broad,
rather than its taxing power, which is narrow.69
3. State Law Requirements of Tax Uniformity
Many state constitutions include tax “uniformity” requirements.
St. Paul, Minnesota, levied a “special assessment” on property owners
to fund road maintenance during the winter months as well as other
routine road repairs. Property owners paid St. Paul based on their
frontage—the length of their property that faces a public way. How-
ever, the city charged residential property owners and commercial
owners different rates. Commercial property owners sued, claiming
the assessment was actually a tax imposed in violation of a number of
65. Louisiana Orleans Parish Tax for Fire and Police Protection, Amendment 6
(2014), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Louisiana_Orleans_Parish_Tax_for_
Fire_and_Police_Protection,_Amendment_6_(2014) [https://perma.unl.edu/M3JJ-
EV5A]; Mike Ward, Big City Mayors to Lege: Don’t Mess with Taxes, HOUS.
CHRON. (Feb. 16, 2015), http://www.chron.com/news/politics/texas/article/Big-
city-mayors-to-Lege-Don-t-mess-with-taxes-6083909.php [https://perma.unl.edu/
4HDF-C9JQ].
66. See Ross Barkan, Bill de Blasio Says New Congestion Pricing Plan ‘Has to Be
Taken Seriously,’ OBSERVER (Feb. 19, 2015), http://observer.com/2015/02/bill-de-
blasio-says-new-congestion-pricing-plan-has-to-be-taken-seriously/ [https://
perma.unl.edu/PT5Y-TRAY] (describing de Blasio’s comments that it was impor-
tant to find long-term solution for MTA finances); Nicholas Confessore, Conges-
tion Pricing Plan Dies in Albany, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2008, 3:01 PM), http://
cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/04/07/congestion-pricing-plan-is-dead-assem-
bly-speaker-says/?_r=0 [https://perma.unl.edu/VE7H-KEXP] (describing New
York State Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver’s decision not to hold vote authoriz-
ing Bloomberg’s congestion pricing plan).
67. Victoria Pierce, Bill to Block Zoo Tax Clears Legislature, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 9, 2011),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-01-09/news/ct-met-zoo-tax-0110-201101
07_1_brookfield-zoo-amusement-tax-zoo-officials [https://perma.unl.edu/G79U-8
XCW].
68. See generally Scharff, supra note 12.
69. Ronald Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use Regulation:
Paying for Growth with Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. REV. 177, 218 (2006) (discussing
that state courts generally inquire whether a local government’s fee is a valid
exercise of police power).
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legal requirements, including uniformity. In 2016, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court sided with property owners, labeling the assessment an
exercise of the city’s taxing authority because the general public
benefitted as much (or more) from these services as the property own-
ers.70 The Court remanded the case to determine whether the design
of the fee presented problems of uniformity or other constitutional
issues.
4. Tax-Exemptions
State law often exempts certain non-profit and governmental enti-
ties from sales and property tax liability. However, such entities are
typically subject to user fees. As a result, local governments some-
times carefully design charges as user fees to ensure that large, non-
profit landowners and governmental entities pay. For example, Ithaca
touted as one of the advantages of its stormwater remediation fee that
Cornell University would also pay the fee.71 As a result of payments
from non-profits, city analysis suggested that residents of the city
would actually see their overall payments to the city go down once the
stormwater remediation fee was added to their bills.72 Accordingly,
disputes can arise between a non-profit and a governmental entity
over whether a levy is a tax or a user fee.
5. Federal Law
Federal law also requires courts to determine whether state and
local governments are levying taxes or charging fees. The Tax Injunc-
tion Act (TIA) limits federal authority to hear challenges to state and
local taxes.73 The TIA, originally passed in 1937, prohibits federal dis-
trict courts from “enjoin[ing], suspend[ing] or restrain[ing] the assess-
ment, [and prohibits the] levy or collection of any tax under State law
where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of
such State.”74 The law allows “state courts to be the final arbiters of
the meaning of their own tax statutes.”75 Without the TIA, non-re-
70. First Baptist Church v. City of St. Paul, 884 N.W.2d 355, 365 (Minn. 2016) (find-
ing the assessment to be a tax subject to constitutional restrictions on taxing
authority).
71. CITY OF ITHICA, STORMWATER TASK FORCE FACT SHEET (2013) (on file with
author).
72. See id.; Why Isn’t Funding for the Stormwater Program Just Included in My
Property Taxes?, CITY OF ITHICA, https://www.cityofithaca.org/Faq.aspx?QID=184
[https://perma.unl.edu/PVA7-9C72].
73. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).
74. Id.
75. Clark R. Calhoun & Timothy L. Fallaw, Avoiding the TIA: Not Impossible but
Close, ST. TAX NOTES, Nov. 8 2010, at 425. Passed in the middle of the Great
Depression, the TIA prevented multi-state corporations from tying up state tax
disputes with federal proceedings, a litigation strategy that denied states much
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sidents could invoke diversity jurisdiction to sue in federal courts to
block tax enforcement, but state residents might only be able to sue in
state court.76 The Act prevents federal courts from disrupting state
revenue collection.77
The TIA, however, does not apply to user fees.78 As a result, a fed-
eral court must determine whether a particular levy constitutes a tax
or a user fee. For example, Illinois required three casinos to make pay-
ments to a greyhound-racing track, a somewhat unusual regulatory/
fiscal regime. When the casinos tried to challenge these payments in
federal court, the court needed to determine whether such payments
constituted fees or taxes.79
Sovereign immunity also invites federal courts to determine
whether a particular levy is a tax or a user fee. Tribes and the federal
government are immune from state and local taxes, but not from user
fees. While the Constitution does not explicitly limit state authority to
tax the federal government, the principal of federal sovereign immu-
nity from state taxation was ensconced in the early years of the repub-
lic, when Chief Justice Marshall famously declared in McCulloch v.
Maryland that the “power to tax involves the power to destroy.”80
Though most constitutional law professors do not stress this point, the
admonition does not apply to user fees. McCulloch does not mean that
“the United States cannot be charged reasonable fees related to the
cost of governmental services provided, such as payment for metered
water usage.”81
Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that state taxes do not ap-
ply to tribes and tribal members for on-reservation activities.82 Thus,
tribal members who live and work on a reservation are immune from
state income taxes.83 But like the federal government, tribal govern-
ments and tribal members can be responsible for user fees reasonably
needed revenue and that gave such multi-state corporations a procedural advan-
tage over their purely local counterparts. See Note, Clarifying Comity: State
Court Jurisdiction and Section 1983 State Tax Challenges, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1888, 1892–93 (1990) [hereinafter “Clarifying Comity”].
76. Clarifying Comity, supra note 75; see also Robert F. Williams, The Tax Injunction
Act and Judicial Restraint: Property Tax Litigation in Federal Courts, 12
RUTGERS L.J. 653, 661–62 (1981) (discussing congressionally enacted restrictions
on the federal judiciary). The TIA does not apply to Indian Tribes or to the United
States. 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012); Calhoun & Fallaw, supra note 75.
77. See Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Balmoral Racing Club, Inc., 651 F.3d 722, 726
(7th Cir. 2011) (“During the pendency of the federal suit the collection of revenue
under the challenged law might be obstructed . . . .”).
78. Calhoun & Fallaw, supra note 75.
79. Empress Casino Joliet Corp., 651 F.3d at 726–27.
80. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819).
81. Novato Fire Prot. Dist. v. United States, 181 F.3d 1135, 1139 (9th Cir. 1999) (cit-
ing United States v. City of Huntington, 999 F.2d 71 (4th Cir. 1993)).
82. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995).
83. McLanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1974).
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related to services provided to the tribe or its members on the
reservation.84
The Supreme Court has not provided a definition of tax for pur-
poses of either federal or tribal sovereign immunity. Federal courts
have generally looked to the relationship between the amount of the
levy and the particular service provided to determine its character.85
Finally, as a general matter, taxes are deductible from federal income
taxes, while fees generally are not.86
In addition to the law requiring federal courts to characterize state
charges, federal law sometimes requires characterization of payments
to foreign countries and payments to the United States. Federal tax
law distinguishes between taxes and other kinds of charges because
only income taxes paid to foreign governments can be offset with the
Foreign Tax Credit.87 Treasury has promulgated regulations for defin-
ing income taxes for this purpose.88 Under these regulations, a pay-
ment is not a tax when the payor “receives (or will receive), directly or
indirectly, a specific economic benefit . . . .”89 Generally speaking, the
courts have not considered this regulatory definition of a tax outside
the context of Foreign Tax Credit cases, in part because the foreign
tax credit does not apply to consumption taxes and other types of
taxes that may be similar to user fees.
Parallel to the Tax Injunction Act, the Anti-Injunction Act prohib-
its federal courts from hearing pre-assessment challenges to federal
taxation.90 In NFIB v. Sebelius, however, the Court held that its Anti-
Injunction Act precedent was not relevant for defining Congress’s tax-
ing power for purposes of Article I, Section Eight, Clause One.91 Like
the jurisprudence surrounding the Foreign Tax Credit, the Court’s
84. Gila River Indian Cmty. v. Waddell, 967 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1992).
85. See, e.g., Novato, 181 F.3d at 1138–39 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussing relevant Su-
preme Court law and law of other circuits).
86. I.R.C. § 164; see also Gladriel Shobe, Disaggregating the State and Local Tax De-
duction, 35 VA TAX REV. 327, 340 (2016) (discussing the complexities involved in
determining whether various property assessments are properly deductible as
taxes). Shobe suggests that some property tax assessments paid by businesses for
property improvements may also be capitalized. Pigouvian levies will often be
deductible for businesses as a cost of doing business, but will not be similarly
deductible for individuals. When facing a carbon price, however, businesses may
choose to make various improvements to reduce carbon emissions. Such improve-
ments would likely be capitalized rather than deductible, even though the carbon
price itself is likely deductible.
87. 26 U.S.C. § 901(b)(1) (allowing credits for the amount of “income, war profits, or
excess profits tax” paid to a foreign country). I thank Shannon McCormick for
reminding me of my federal income tax roots.
88. 26 C.F.R. § 1.901-2 (2017).
89. Id. § 1.901-2(a)(2)(i).
90. 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2012).
91. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 545–46 (2012).
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constitutional understanding of the federal taxing power has not sig-
nificantly impacted state court doctrine.92
C. The Doctrine Does Not Readily Distinguish Taxes from
User Fees
As discussed, whether a given levy is categorized as a tax or a user
fee often determines whether the levy is valid.93 Unfortunately, the
law distinguishing taxes from user fees is far from clear.94
No one would characterize a property tax as a user fee, even
though higher property tax rates often support better public ser-
vices.95 The receipt of these benefits is simply not contingent on the
payment of a property tax. Nor would anyone question whether a
green fee at a local golf course constitutes anything other than a user
fee.
The clarity at the ends of these categories, however, masks much
confusion in the middle. Across the country, state courts have strug-
gled to define these boundaries. As the Georgia Supreme Court has
observed, “it is frequently difficult to discern whether a given enact-
ment provides for a regulatory fee or authorizes simply a tax.”96
States have taken a variety of approaches to distinguishing these
two categories. In this section, I develop a typology of common ap-
proaches taken by state law, and I also take a detailed look at Califor-
nia’s repeated efforts to disentangle taxes from fees through the
initiative process.97
92. Of the fifty-one state court cases citing the NFIB decision, only a handful deal
with state tax issues. The opinion has been cited to support the general proposi-
tion that taxes can serve a regulatory purpose. See, e.g., Garwood v. State, 77
N.E.3d 204, 225 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), aff’d in part, vacated in part 84 N.E.3d 624
(Ind. 2017) (“Furthermore, the use of tax as a means to nontax ends is allowed
today and is nearly as old as taxation itself. (citing Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519
(2012))). However, even in these opinions the citation is not central to the court’s
holding.
93. See supra section II.B. (discussing the ways in which the distinction between user
fee and tax matters for the legal validity of the tax).
94. See Spitzer, supra note 35, at 342–44. As Hugh Spitzer observes, historically the
question of whether a charge was a fee or a tax turned on whether the revenue
supported “public goods” or “private goods.” Id.
95. Higher property taxes might be supported on a benefits theory of taxation, but
the benefits theory of taxation is a theory, not a legal test. JOEL SLEMROD & JON
BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES 62–63 (2008) (discussing the “benefit principle” and
why it is hard to apply in the context of taxation).
96. McLeod v. Columbia County, 599 S.E.2d 152, 154 (Ga. 2004) (citing Hadley v.
City of Atlanta, 502 S.E.2d 784 (Ga. 1998)).
97. Two other papers have looked at the ways states generally distinguish between
taxes and fees. Joseph Henchman explores the question in HOW IS THE MONEY
USED?: FEDERAL AND STATE CASES DISTINGUISH TAXES AND FEES (2013). Hench-
man’s paper, however, explores this doctrine with an eye toward narrowing the
definition of user fees under state law to ensure broad applicability of tax limita-
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The first set of state law approaches, which I call the single-factor
approaches, places significant weight on a single characteristic of the
charge. Unsurprisingly, the second approach, the “multi-factor” ap-
proach, looks at a range of factors. The third approach, adopted by
California voters, is a narrow definition of user fees that categorizes
many types of extractions as taxes. Finally, federal circuit courts have
adopted multi-factor tests that differ in focus from the tests developed
independently by state courts. In this section, I consider each of these
approaches in turn.
1. Single-Factor Approaches
Some state courts rely primarily on a single defining characteristic
to determine whether a particular charge is a user fee or a tax. For
example, some state courts focus on how the funds are to be spent. If
the money raised from the charge supports general public spending,
called “general revenue,” it is a tax. If the money is segregated for a
specific purpose related to the charge, it is a user fee. For example, in
South Dakota, if the revenue only “cover[s] the cost and expense of
supervision or regulation” it is a fee, but if it exceeds those costs, it is a
tax.98
Other courts focus on the intentions of those enacting the charge.
In Texas, for example, the distinction between a tax and a user fee
turns entirely on whether the purported fee is imposed for regulatory
or revenue purposes.99
2. The Multi-Factor Approach
Many states use a variety of factors in making the tax/user fee de-
termination. Factors include the statute’s purpose (sometimes as re-
flected in its plain language), voluntariness, and proportionality to the
benefit conferred.100 Charges enacted for the purpose of raising reve-
nue are taxes, whereas charges enacted for other purposes (like regu-
latory purposes) may be user fees.101 In looking at the voluntariness of
the charge, courts consider how much flexibility payors have in avoid-
ing the charge.102 Obviously, a charge for the use of the municipal golf
tions. Jasper Cummings has also looked at these issues, but his work blends fed-
eral and state law. JASPER L. CUMMINGS JR., USER FEES VERSUS TAXES (2011).
98. Valandra v. Viedt, 259 N.W.2d 510, 512 (S.D. 1977).
99. See County of Harris v. Shepperd, 291 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex. 1956) (“A charge or
fee which has regulation for its purpose is imposed under the police power. On
the other hand, if for the purpose of raising revenue, it is a tax and levied under
taxing power.”); Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc. v. Comm’r of Ins., 626 S.W.2d
822, 828 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981).
100. See HENCHMAN, supra note 97, at 16–97.
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., infra notes 117–20 and accompanying text (discussing Michigan’s ap-
proach to voluntariness).
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course is completely voluntary. At the other extreme, property owners
cannot avoid a property tax except by selling their property. If the
amount of the charge is close to the economic benefit conferred on the
payor (or the cost to the government providing the service) then that
charge is more likely to be a user fee.103
Of course, each state’s specific factors are different. In Michigan,
the court evaluates a user fee under three criteria: (1) whether the fee
serves a regulatory or a revenue-raising purpose; (2) whether the fee
is proportional to the benefit conferred; and (3) whether the fee is vol-
untary.104 Massachusetts has similar criteria.105
It is helpful to consider a specific example of how the multi-factor
test works. Courts in Arkansas look to the fee’s relationship to the
benefit conferred, who the payor is, how the funds will be used, and
how the fees compare to similar private services. In Harris v. City of
Little Rock, the plaintiff challenged Little Rock’s decision to raise user
fees at its recreational facilities in order to pay for the building of a
new presidential park that would house the Clinton Presidential Li-
brary.106 The court upheld these fees, noting the trial court’s finding
that only park users pay the fee and that the fees were segregated
from the city’s general revenue and put into a special enterprise fund
supporting municipal parks.107 The court also noted that the city’s
recreational fees were competitively priced when considering the
market.108
State courts frequently look to decisions in sister jurisdictions in
choosing which factors to consider and how to apply them. Georgia, for
example, originally adopted a single-factor, general revenue ap-
proach.109 Later cases, however, emphasize that voluntariness is also
an important feature of user fees,110 and recently the state supreme
court has looked to the multi-factor test of Florida for guidance.111
103. See Spitzer note 35, at 348.
104. HENCHMAN, supra note 97 (citing Bolt v. City of Lansing, 587 N.W.2d 264 (Mich.
1990)).
105. Id. at 50; Easthampton Sav. Bank v. City of Springfield, 21 N.E.3d 922, 935–37
(Mass. 2014).
106. Harris v. City of Little Rock, 40 S.W.3d 214, 216 (Ark. 2001).
107. Id. at 221–22.
108. Id. at 222.
109. Gunby v. Yates, 102 S.E.2d 548, 550–51 (Ga. 1958).
110. McLeod v. Columbia County, 599 S.E.2d 152, 155 (Ga. 2004) (“Whether a charge
is voluntary is also a factor since, if it is not mandatory, it cannot be a tax.”); Luke
v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 513 S.E.2d 728, 729 (Ga. 1999) (“[T]he essential characteris-
tics of a tax are that it is not a voluntary payment or donation, but an enforced
contribution, exacted pursuant to legislative authority.” (internal citation
omitted)).
111. McLeod, 599 S.E.2d at 155 (citing Sarasota County v. Sarasota Church of Christ,
667 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1995)).
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The multi-factor approach seems to be more common in jurisdic-
tions with more litigation challenging user fees. For example, Georgia
originally adopted a general revenue approach, but has developed a
multi-factor test over time.
Courts have exercised their interpretative authority in analyzing
whether a particular levy satisfies a relevant factor. For example,
courts have significant leeway in determining whether the user fee is
proportional to the cost of providing the benefit. Most courts, rather
than declaring mathematical certainty as the standard, look for a rea-
sonable relationship.112 As the Michigan Court of Appeals describes
its requirement, “[t]he test is whether the fee is proportional, not
whether it is equal, to the amount required to support the services it
regulates.”113 The proportionately requirement is satisfied as long as
the fee is not “wholly disproportionate.”114
The courts also have leeway in determining what government costs
can be considered. In Murphy v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority,
the Massachusetts Supreme Court considered a challenge to the Au-
thority’s use of tolls to pay for infrastructure costs on both tolled and
non-tolled roads, tunnels, and bridges. The plaintiffs presented evi-
dence that 58% of the toll revenue supported other infrastructure.
Nevertheless, the court held that the tolls were user fees, finding that
[w]here, as here, a public authority manages an integrated system of road-
ways, bridges, and tunnels, and chooses to impose tolls on only some of the
roadways and tunnels in an amount sufficient to support the entire integrated
system, its purpose does not shift from expense reimbursement to revenue
raising simply because the toll revenues exceed the cost of maintaining only
the tolled portions of the integrated system.115
In other words, the court did not require tolls to support exclusively
the upkeep of the roadways from which the tolls were taken, or even to
support tolled roadways in general. The tolls could provide financial
support for all roadways.
In those states where “voluntariness” is a relevant factor, courts
have been even more malleable in their analysis. Voluntariness can
often be a matter of perspective. As scholar Laurie Reynolds has
noted, at the right level of abstraction, even income and sales taxes
are voluntary.116 No one requires that you earn income or buy goods
112. Dawson v. Sec’y of State, 739 N.W.2d 339, 355 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007).
113. Id. at 352 (quoting Westlake Transp., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 662 N.W.2d 784
(Mich. Ct. App. 2003)).
114. Id.
115. Murphy v. Mass. Tpk. Auth., 971 N.E.2d 231, 239–40 (Mass. 2012) (“Nor must
every road, bridge, and tunnel in an integrated system of roadways, bridges, and
tunnels be tolled to enable the tolls collected to support the expenses of the entire
integrated system without being deemed taxes.”).
116. Reynolds, supra note 42, at 412.
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and services, and if you don’t earn or consume, you don’t owe these
taxes.
State court decisions on the voluntariness factor sometimes push
toward abstractions. Michigan courts have been especially willing to
adopt an expansive definition of voluntariness. In one Michigan case,
a developer challenged an increase in a water line tap-in connection
fee.117 The developer argued that the municipal fee was an unconsti-
tutional tax under Michigan’s Headlee Amendment because the city
imposed the increase without a popular vote.118 The state court of ap-
peals rejected this argument, noting that the plaintiff “need not pay
the tap-in fee unless it decides to install a home site in a particular
location. It has the ability to choose whether to use the service at
all.”119 In other words, the developer could always choose to leave the
property undeveloped and thereby avoid the tax. Another Michigan
case found a two dollar charge assessed on pawnshop transactions to
be voluntary because
[b]y the plain language of the city ordinance, the reporting requirements and
attendant regulatory fee only apply to an individual or business that chooses
to enter into secondhand transactions of a certain volume within a given pe-
riod of time. The decision to engage in secondhand transactions at all, and the
number of transactions in which to engage, is a purely voluntary decision
within the complete control of an individual or business.120
Thus, the court concluded that the fee was voluntary because the
pawnshop owners could choose to do less business and thereby avoid
the fee.
Other courts have simply limited the class of user fees for which
voluntariness is required. For example, Florida courts only require
voluntariness when the user fee is not authorized by statute.121 Simi-
larly, Massachusetts does not require voluntariness when analyzing
what it terms regulatory fees, which are imposed to cover the adminis-
trative costs of participating in a regulated activity.122
While the multi-factor approach appears to offer more nuanced
guidance to courts and policy makers than the general revenue ap-
proach, in practice parties may find the multi-factor approach no more
predictable than the single-factor tests.
117. Mapleview Estates, Inc. v. City of Brown City, 671 N.W.2d 572, 573 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2003).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 575.
120. USA Cash #1, Inc. v. City of Saginaw, 776 N.W.2d 346, 360 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009)
(internal quotations omitted).
121. City of Gainesville v. Florida, 863 So. 2d 138, 146 (Fla. 2003).
122. See Silva v. City of Attleboro, 908 N.E.2d 722, 727 (Mass. 2009). “This court sub-
sequently recognized in Silva that voluntariness is not an essential characteristic
of all fees and, in particular, is not ‘relevant in the regulatory fee context.’” Doe v.
Sex Offender Registry Bd., 947 N.E.2d 9, 19 (Mass. 2011) (quoting Silva, 908
N.E.2d at 727–28).
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3. The California Approach
California takes a unique approach to defining user fees and taxes
as a result of the frequent interplay between California’s courts and
voters. Historians and other scholars often trace the beginning of the
“tax revolt” of the 1970s to California’s Proposition 13.123 While there
is significant scholarly debate about what actually caused Proposition
13,124 there is widespread agreement that it was successful in limiting
property tax growth in California.125 The proposition amended the
California constitution to limit property valuation growth for current
property owners, limited the property tax rate, and required a
supermajority of voters to approve increases to other taxes and special
assessments.126
California’s local governments immediately felt the pinch of these
tax limits and sought other sources of revenue.127 Municipalities seek-
ing additional revenue to replace reductions in property taxes turned
to user fees, many times replacing property taxes with user fees asso-
ciated with the ownership of property.128 They also turned to special
property assessments, which are “compulsory charge[s] placed by the
state upon real property within a pre-determined district, made under
express legislative authority for defraying in whole or in part the ex-
123. See William V. Roth Jr., The “Malmanagement” Problem: Finding the Roots of
Government Waste, Fraud, and Abuse, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 961, 961 n.2
(1983).
124. See William A. Fischel, How Serrano Caused Proposition 13, 12 J.L. & POL. 607,
624 (1996) (discussing multiple theories on the impetus of Proposition 13).
125. See S.S. Silberblatt Inc. v. United States, 888 F.2d 829, 830 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (stat-
ing Proposition 13 limited property taxes to one percent of the property’s value);
Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of Riverside, 86 Cal. Rptr.2d 592, 595 (Ct.
App. 1999) (explaining that Proposition 13’s intent was to reduce property taxes
and describing its methods for doing so); Sonoma Cty. Org. of Pub. Emps. v.
County of Sonoma, 591 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1979) (Proposition 13 “placed significant
limitations upon the taxing power of local and state government”).
126. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 1(a) (limiting ad valorem tax on real property to one
percent of the property’s assessed value); id. § 2(b) (limiting, in part, the inflation
rate for property value to two percent in a year’s time); id. § 3(a) (requiring a 2/3
majority in both houses to change statutes to increase taxes and preventing impo-
sition of new ad valorem and property taxes); id. § 3(b) (defining tax and excep-
tions); id. § 4 (permitting cities, counties, and special districts to impose taxes
other than property taxes by a 2/3 majority); County of Los Angeles v. Sasaki, 29
Cal. Rptr. 2d 103, 108 (Ct. App. 1994) (“[Proposition 13’s] effect was to drastically
cut property tax revenue, and thereby sharply reduce the funds available from
that source to local governments, and also schools.” (citations omitted)); Sonoma
County, 591 P.2d at 3.
127. S.S. Silberblatt, 888 F.2d at 830 (“Many taxing authorities responded by institut-
ing alternative methods of generating revenue, such as through special assess-
ments and service charges.”).
128. Isaac v. City of Los Angeles, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 752, 758–59 (Ct. App. 1998).
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pense of a permanent public improvement.”129 The California Su-
preme Court held that special assessments were not special taxes
under Proposition 13, and therefore could be imposed without meeting
the supermajority requirements.130
Voters in California pushed back, passing Proposition 218 in
1996.131 Proposition 218 restricted the ability of local governments to
use assessments in lieu of property taxes and also limited their ability
to impose property-related user fees.132
Even after Proposition 218, state and local governments continued
to impose a variety of non-property-related fees that were not subject
to Proposition 13 limits.133 One such regulatory fee required busi-
nesses involved in lead pollution to contribute to a fund to pay for the
health care costs associated with lead poisoning.134 In Sinclair Paint
Company v. State Board of Equalization, the California Supreme
Court upheld this regulatory fee against a challenge asserting that it
was a disguised tax passed without the supermajority required under
Proposition 13.135
The Sinclair court distinguished taxes and fees by stating that
taxes generally “are imposed for revenue purposes, rather than in re-
turn for a specific benefit conferred or privilege granted,” and are
“compulsory rather than imposed in response to a voluntary decision
to develop or to seek other government benefits or privileges.”136 Sum-
marizing prior case history, the court held that three types of levies
did not constitute special taxes under the California constitution.137
The first were “special assessments on property or similar business
charges, in amounts reasonably reflecting the value of the benefits
conferred by improvements” such as those on businesses for downtown
promotion or street construction.138 The second category consisted of
129. San Marcos Water Dist. v. San Marcos Unified Sch. Dist., 720 P.2d 935, 939 (Cal.
1986) (quoting Spring St. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 148 P.217 (Cal. 1915)), super-
seded by statute, CAL. GOV’T Code § 54999 (West 2010).
130. Knox v. City of Orland, 841 P.2d 144, 150–52 (Cal. 1992), superseded by constitu-
tional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. XIIID, § 3.
131. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of Riverside, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 592, 595 (Ct.
App. 1999).
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 937 P.2d 1350, 1351 (Cal.
1997).
134. Id. at 1352.
135. Id. at 1358.
136. Id. at 1354 (internal citations omitted).
137. Id. at 1353–56.
138. Id. at 1354 (emphasis omitted) (citing Evans v. City of San Jose, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d
601, 605–08 (Ct. App. 1992) (“assessments on businesses for the purposes of gen-
eral downtown promotion”)); see also J.W. Jones Cos. v. City of San Diego, 203
Cal. Rptr. 580, 583–89 (Ct. App. 1984) (“facilities benefit assessments”); City
Council v. South, 194 Cal. Rptr. 110, 118 (Ct. App. 1983) (special assessments on
real property); County of Fresno v. Malmstrom, 156 Cal. Rptr. 777, 783 (Ct. App.
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“development fees exacted in return for building permits or other gov-
ernmental privileges” if the fee amount is reasonable in light of the
community’s costs and the developer’s gains.139 The third were regu-
latory fees that “do not exceed the reasonable cost of providing ser-
vices necessary to the activity for which the fee is charged and which
are not levied for unrelated revenue purposes.”140
The court found that regulatory fees are permissible even when the
payors are unable to reap a tangible benefit,141 noting that “if regula-
tion is the primary purpose of the fee measure, the mere fact that the
measure also generates revenue does not make the imposition a
tax.”142 The court viewed these fees as an exercise of the police power,
not the taxing power.143 The Sinclair court held that the lead pollu-
tion fee in question was a permissible regulatory fee.144 The court
found that the same policing authority which permitted the operation
of the companies and businesses could reasonably regulate and expect
them to contribute to the “cleanup” of the lead problem.145 Further-
1979) (special assessments for construction of streets) superseded by constitu-
tional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 4.
139. Sinclair, 937 P.2d at 1354 (emphasis omitted) (citing Shapell Indus., Inc. v. Gov-
erning Bd., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 818 (Ct. App. 1991) (“school facilities fee”)); see also
Bixel Assocs. v. City of Los Angeles, 265 Cal. Rptr. 347, 349 (Ct. App. 1989) (“fire
hydrant fees”); Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n. v. Governing Bd., 253 Cal. Rptr. 497,
510–11 (Ct. App. 1988) (school development fees); Russ Bldg. P’ship v. City of San
Francisco, 246 Cal. Rptr. 21, 24–26 (Ct. App. 1987) (“transit impact fee”) aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, Russ. Bldg. P’ship v. City of San Francisco, 750 P.2d 324 (Cal.
1988); Beaumont Inv’rs v. Beaumont-Cherry Valley Water Dist., 211 Cal. Rptr.
567, 571–73 (Ct. App. 1985) (new facilities water hookup fees); Trent Meredith,
Inc. v. City of Oxnard, 170 Cal. Rptr. 685, 689–91 (Ct. App. 1981) (fees as precon-
dition for building permits); Mills v. County of Trinity, 166 Cal. Rptr. 674, 676–78
(Ct. App. 1980) (“fees for county services in processing subdivision, zoning, and
other land use applications”); Ehrlich v. Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 458–59 (Cal.
1996).
140. Sinclair, 937 P.2d at 1355 (citing City of Oakland v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. App.
740 (1996) (upholding charges on alcohol sales licenses to support a project ad-
dressing public nuisances associated with alcohol sales as regulatory fees)); see
also Kern Cty. Farm Bureau v. County of Kern, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 910, 914–17 (Ct.
App. 1993) (upholding landfill assessment based on land use to reduce illegal
waste disposal); City of Dublin v. County of Alameda, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 845,
855–58 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (upholding waste disposal surcharge imposed on
waste haulers); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego Cty. Air Pollution Control
Dist., 250 Cal. Rptr. 420, 428–31 (Ct. App. 1988) (upholding emissions-based
formula for recovering direct and indirect costs of pollution emissions permit pro-
grams); United Bus. Comm’n. v. City of San Diego, 154 Cal. Rptr. 263, 269–72
(Ct. App. 1979) (upholding fees for inspecting and inventorying on-premises ad-
vertising signs).
141. Sinclair, 937 P.2d at 1355.
142. Id. at 1358 (citing United Bus. Comm’n., 154 Cal. Rptr. 263).
143. Id. at 1356.
144. Id. at 1358.
145. Id. at 1356.
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more, the court asserted that fees could regulate behavior by deterring
future manufacturing and sale of lead products.146
In the wake of Sinclair Paint, California voters further restricted
user fees.147 Proposition 26, which voters approved in 2010, added a
new definition of user fees to the California constitution that was
much narrower than that offered by the court.148
Proposition 26 defines a tax as “any levy, charge, or exaction of any
kind imposed by the State” unless the levy, charge, or exaction falls
into five narrow exceptions.149 The exceptions include (1) charges
where only the party that pays receives a specific benefit or privilege
from the State and are not greater than the State’s reasonable costs in
conferring that benefit or granting the privilege; (2) charges where
only the party that pays receives a specific service or product from the
state and which are not greater than the State’s reasonable costs in
providing the service or product; (3) charges related to administrative
and regulatory costs the State incurs in issuing permits or undertak-
ing inspections and audits; (4) charges connected with use of state
property; and (5) fines and penalties imposed by the judiciary for legal
violations.150
In Schmeer v. County of Los Angeles, the court upheld a county
ordinance that banned stores from providing plastic bags and imposed
a ten-cent-per-bag charge on paper bags because the stores, rather
than the county, collected and kept the proceeds from the charge.151
The Schmeer court limited the definition of “any levy charge, or exac-
tion of any kind imposed by a local government” to those paid to the
government.152 Courts have continued to interpret the Proposition 26
exceptions to include a variety of charges.153
146. Id.
147. Schmeer v. County of Los Angeles, 153 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352, 361 (Ct. App. 2013).
148. Id. at 363–64.
149. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 3(b).
150. Id. § 3(b)(1–5).
151. Schmeer, 153 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 354, 366.
152. Id. at 364–65.
153. For example, in California Building Industry Ass’n v. State Water Resources Con-
trol Board, the court upheld the State Water Resources Control Board’s fee on
those who discharged waste that could impact the state’s water quality. 186 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 212, 216 (Ct. App. 2015) superseded by 352 P.3d 418 (Cal. 2015). Each
party who emits such waste discharge was required to file a report and pay a fee
to be deposited in the Waste Discharge Permit Fund for use by the State Water
Resources Control Board. Id. at 216–17. The court found the charges were rea-
sonable because they were not demonstrated to exceed the program’s costs, nor
was it proven that “allocation of the fees was unfair or unreasonable.” Id. at 216.
The court also noted that “the reasonableness of the fee is not measured by the
impact on an individual payor,” but by consideration of all cost and all payors. Id.
at 228 (citing Cal. Farm Bureau Fed’s v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 247 P.3d
112, 124 (Cal. 2011)). City of San Buenaventura v. United Water Conservation
District involved a district which managed groundwater and a city which pumped
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So far, no other state has chosen to follow California’s lead in ex-
panding the definition of tax so broadly or offering such precise consti-
tutional guidance about the difference between the two categories of
taxes and fees.154
4. Federal Court Approaches
In addition to these state court approaches, federal courts have cre-
ated their own tests for distinguishing taxes from user fees. As dis-
cussed in section II.A, federal courts must distinguish between state
taxes and state user fees in several settings.
The dominant federal law approach is a multi-factor test developed
by then-Circuit Court Judge Stephen Breyer in a case brought by San
Juan Cellular Telephone Company against the Commonwealth of Pu-
erto Rico.155 Breyer provided three factors to determine whether the
levies imposed by Puerto Rico on cellular providers were taxes subject
to the Tax Injunction Act. Those factors are (1) “the entity that im-
poses the assessment;” (2) “the parties upon whom the assessment is
imposed;” and (3) “whether the assessment is expended for general
public purposes, or used for the regulation or benefit of the parties
upon whom the assessment is imposed.”156
Under the first factor, courts assume that levies imposed by ad-
ministrative agencies, as opposed to the legislature, are more likely to
be user fees.157 Under the second factor, the courts consider the rela-
the District’s water for sale to its residents. 185 Cal. Rptr. 3d 207, 210 (Ct. App.
2015), petition for review granted, 351 P.3d 328 (Cal. 2015), superseded by 406
P.3d 733 (2017). The District charged a fee for the pumping, assessed by volume
and whether the use was agricultural or not. Combinations of separate billing
zones led to higher groundwater pumping rates for some and the City objected,
alleging, in part, that the increase was contrary to provisions of Propositions 13,
218, and 26. Id. at 212–13, 216. The court held the pump fees were not property-
related charges, and thus, Proposition 218 was inapplicable. Id. at 221. The court
also held that fees were not taxes because they fell into the “payor-specific bene-
fits and privileges” exception by granting those who pay the charge the right to
use the groundwater. Id. at 225–26.
154. LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES, PROPOSITION 26 IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE 1–6
(2011) (describing the specific history of California’s definition of taxation).
155. San Juan Cellular Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of P.R., 967 F.2d 683 (1st Cir.
1992). There is also a line of cases exploring the validity of federal user fees.
Gillette and Hopkins, supra note 28, at 822–45, discuss such cases brought under
the Independent Offices Appropriation Act and other statutory authority. The
relevant portion of the Independent Offices Appropriation Act was codified as 31
U.S.C. § 9701 and provides statutory authority for agencies to charge fees for
services.
156. Bidart Bros v. California Apple Comm’n, 73 F.3d 925, 931 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing
San Juan Cellular, 967 F.2d at 685).
157. Id. At the federal level, it is true that user fees are generally set by agencies.
Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 28, at 822 (“Congress, however, does not possess
the capacity to set individually the myriad fees for the vast array of services that
the government provides. That function must, as a practical necessity, be per-
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tionship of the party to the assessment,158 and under the third factor,
federal courts look at the relationship between the levy and the bene-
fit conferred.159 To the extent the levy provides a more generalized
public benefit, such as funding public schools, the levy is more likely to
be a tax.160 To the extent the levy imposes a particularized benefit or
covers the administrative costs of regulating a particular business ac-
tivity, it is more likely to be a user fee.161 Justice Breyer’s multi-factor
approach, however, is subject to many of the same definitional
problems as the multi-factor tests developed by state courts. For ex-
ample, because government revenue is fungible, it is not clear what
should turn on whether a particular levy is earmarked for a particu-
larized benefit or a more generalized public benefit.
As described in this section, courts use a variety of tests to deter-
mine whether a given government extraction is a tax or a user fee. As
I will detail in the next Part, none of these tests are particularly help-
ful when it comes to classifying Pigovian extractions.
III. PIGOVIAN TAXES V. PIGOVIAN USER FEES
Economists have long called on policymakers to consider an alter-
native to the traditional income tax base, one that addresses negative
externalities, that is, the “uncompensated cost[s] that [people] impose[
] on others.”162 Economists call such taxes Pigovian taxes, after the
English economist Arthur Pigou, who first developed the idea of im-
posing a tax equal to the magnitude of the harm caused by the exter-
nality.163 However, Pigovian pricing can also be considered a varient
of user fees, where the payor is paying for the externality costs she
imposes on society through her actions.164
When Arthur Pigou first developed the idea of a compensatory tax,
he saw it as an efficient response to a variety of externalities.165 Pigou
was concerned about pollution in rapidly industrializing England, and
his discussion of externalities referenced the example of a factory in-
creasing congestion, reducing light, and causing health problems for
formed by the provider of the service, typically an administrative agency within
the executive branch.”). Of course, this is not always the case at the state or local
level.
158. San Juan Cellular, 967 F.2d at 685.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 685–86.
162. PAUL KRUGMAN & ROBIN WELLS, MICROECONOMICS 437 (2d ed. 2009).
163. Id. at 443–44.
164. See Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 28, at 803–04 (discussing externalities as a
market failure that can be addressed by user fees).
165. See generally ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1920),
http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/1410/Pigou_0316_EBk_v6.0.pdf [https://
perma.unl.edu/M9G6-T8QW].
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those living in its neighborhood.166 But Pigou also considered other
types of social harms. For example, he argued that businesses selling
alcohol produce net social costs.167
Pigovian charges can address a variety of externalities, but they
have caught hold most deeply in environmental economics as an effi-
cient way to reduce the costs of pollution.168 Many economists have
been enthusiastic about Pigovian approaches because they offer the
potential of a “double dividend.” Fans of this approach argue that the
collection of this revenue offers the opportunity to improve efficiency.
Transactions that don’t happen because of the Pigovian tax are ineffi-
cient. Not only does the Pigovian tax produce the desired behavioral
response,169 but, by pricing the externality, it also potentially raises
revenue the government can spend for other purposes, hence the
double dividend.170
Of course, the possibility of this double dividend actually being de-
livered depends on a number of assumptions about the implementa-
tion of the tax and the ways it would interact with existing regulations
166. Id. at 108 (“They are rendered, again, when the owner of a site in a residential
quarter of a city builds a factory there and so destroys a great part of the ameni-
ties of the neighbouring sites; or, in a less degree, when he uses his site in such a
way as to spoil the lighting of the houses opposite: or when he invests resources
in erecting buildings in a crowded centre, which, by contracting the air space and
the playing-room of the neighbourhood, tend to injure the health and efficiency of
the families living there. Yet again, third parties—this time the public in gen-
eral—suffer incidental uncharged disservices from resources invested in the run-
ning of motor cars that wear out the surface of the roads.”).
167. Id. at 111 (“The private net product of any unit of investment is unduly large
relatively to the social net product in the businesses of producing and distributing
alcoholic drinks. Consequently, in nearly all countries, special taxes are placed
upon these businesses.”).
168. Pigouvian Taxes, ECONOMIST (Aug. 19, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/
economics-brief/21726709-what-do-when-interests-individuals-and-society-do-
not-coincide-fourth [https://perma.unl.edu/Y88A-JYXP].
169. Of course, as Katie Pratt reminded me, the potential behavioral response to the
pricing regime will also be affected by the elasticity of the priced goods. Pricing
regimes might not work as well as command-and-control regulation if we are very
worried about inelastic demand, and if a particular charge doesn’t change behav-
ior, the distributional effects of the charge may be quite regressive. In other
words, Pigouvian taxation in and of itself does not necessarily resolve an equity
versus efficiency debate. See Don Fullerton & Gilbert E. Metcalf, Environmental
Taxes and the Double-Dividend Hypothesis: Did You Really Expect Something for
Nothing?, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 221, 223 (1998) (“Thus the impact of the reform
depends on how it affects relative prices and incentives to work, produce, and
pollute.”); see also Katherine Pratt, A Constructive Critique of Public Health Ar-
guments for Anti-obesity Soda Taxes and Food Taxes, 87 TUL. L. REV. 73, 122–35
(2012) (discussing these distributional effects in the context of taxes designed to
curb obesity).
170. See generally DALE W. JORGENSON ET AL., DOUBLE DIVIDEND: ENVIRONMENTAL
TAXES AND FISCAL REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES (2013) (modeling the possibility
of a double dividend).
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and taxes.171 Because the Pigovian levy achieves its regulatory pur-
pose no matter how the funds are spent, economists have long sug-
gested that an attractive feature of Pigovian taxation is that it can
reduce dependence on inefficient taxation.172 For example, economist
Gilbert Metcalf has proposed a federal carbon tax that would allow
Congress to cut payroll tax rates, thereby increasing the progressivity
of federal taxation.173 There is no obvious relationship between the
goals of reducing carbon emissions and increasing federal tax progres-
sivity. Such indifference to the way revenue is spent is at odds, how-
ever, with traditional state user fee doctrine, which, as discussed
above, focuses on how the revenue is spent.
This Part explores two different policies that could be character-
ized as Pigovian in nature. The first, an emissions tax, is the classic
example of a Pigovian tax. The second, stormwater remediation fees,
are often structured as utility fees (like municipal trash and water
charges), but have a Pigovian element.
A. Emissions Taxes
1. Emissions Taxes in Theory
Pollution has long been a by-product of industrialization. Centu-
ries before scientists noted the dangers of climate change, residents of
factory towns complained.174 Pittsburgh’s steel mills made the city
dark even during daytime hours.175 For centuries, no one has wanted
to live near a tannery.
The Industrial Revolution demanded a government response to
pollution abatement, but crafting statutes that effectively improved
the environment was not an easy task.176 Abandoning classic land use
controls like zoning and common law nuisance claims, the modern en-
171. See Fullerton & Metcalf, supra note 169, at 223 (“Thus the impact of the reform
depends on how it affects relative prices and incentives to work, produce, and
pollute.”).
172. Id. at 232–38 (discussing literature on double-dividend hypothesis and efforts to
simulate the possible efficiency gains from pollution tax revenue).
173. Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 499, 517 (2009) (indicating that revenue generated from a carbon
tax could be passed on as savings via cuts to income or payroll taxes); see also N.
Gregory Mankiw, One Answer to Global Warming: A New Tax, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
16, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/16/business/16view.html (discussing
the Metcalf proposal).
174. See Joel Franklin Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution, 3 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 403, 416–18 (1974).
175. Mark Byrnes, What Pittsburgh Looked Like When It Decided It Had a Pollution
Problem, CITYLAB (June 5, 2012), https://www.citylab.com/design/2012/06/what-
pittsburgh-looked-when-it-decided-it-had-pollution-problem/2185 [https://
perma.unl.edu/K7LP-K2GF].
176. See Brenner supra note 174, at 425–28 (discussing early British statutes combat-
ting pollution).
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vironmental movement first sought to protect the environment by set-
ting emissions levels, banning pollutants, and mandating that
businesses use specific technologies to abate pollution.177
By the late 1970s, a growing number of environmental economists
and policymakers began to question this approach, termed the “com-
mand-and-control” model of pollution control.178 These scholars criti-
cized the command-and-control model as “forc[ing] firms to shoulder
similar shares of the pollution-control burden, regardless of the rela-
tive costs to them.”179 Such standards failed to incentivize those firms
or industries which are able to abate emissions much more cheaply.
As a result, command-and-control efforts did not necessarily focus on
the cheapest abatement options.180 Neither did such policies incen-
tivize emissions reductions beyond the required amount, even when
such reductions were relatively cheap. As a result, “command . . . and
. . . control regulations tend to freeze the development of technologies
that might otherwise result in greater levels of control.”181
Armed with the insights of Pigovian theory, scholars critical of
command-and-control policies argued that lawmakers should adopt
market-based regulations.182 They argued that such market-based
regulations would allow companies to profit from their innovation and
focus abatement activity within the firms and sectors where pollution
reductions were the most cost-effective.183 Command-and-control poli-
cies still have a place in ensuring environmental quality, especially for
substances for which there is no safe level of use and which can be
phased out without significant economic costs. However, the debate
about climate change policies has shifted to a market-based approach,
in part because carbon-emitting activities are so central to the
economy.184
For example, under an emissions tax, firms pay a per-unit fee for
emissions. An ideal emissions tax sets this fee equal to the marginal
social cost of producing an additional unit of emissions.185 In other
177. See, e.g., William D. Ruckelshaus, Environmental Protection: A Brief History of
the Environmental Movement in America and the Implications Abroad, 15 ENVTL.
L. 455, 457–60 (1985).
178. See Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous
Journey from Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 103 n.1,
107 (1998) (discussing the traditional critiques of command-and-control).
179. Robert N. Stavins, Market-Based Environmental Policies, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 32 (Paul R. Portney & Robert N. Stavins eds., 2d ed.
2000).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental
Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985).
183. Id. at 1341–42.
184. THE ECONOMIST, supra note 168.
185. KRUGMAN & WELLS, supra note 162, at 442.
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words, the tax requires the firm to internalize the full social harm that
their emissions-producing activities create.186 Firms that can abate
cheaply will do so rather than pay the tax. Firms who cannot afford
the abatement cost will either pay the tax or exit the market.
2. Emissions Taxes in Practice
Following the Pigovian model, a handful of countries have imple-
mented a pollution tax on carbon emissions.187 In the United States, a
handful of local governments have imposed climate charges.188 For ex-
ample, in 2007, Boulder, Colorado, became the first municipality in
186. In addition to a Pigovian tax, policymakers also explored another “market” ap-
proach to limiting emissions, a cap-and-trade system. Under a cap-and-trade (or
marketable permit) system, the government regulates emissions quantity, set-
ting a maximum amount of emissions and then either allocating or auctioning
permits that allow companies to emit pollutants up to that quantity. By allowing
firms to trade permits, the government creates a situation where firms facing a
high cost of abatement can purchase permits from firms with a lower abatement
cost. See Policy Basics: Policies to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions, CTR. ON
BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, (2015), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/at-
oms/files/PolicyBasic_CapTrade.pdf (providing a basic description of a cap-and-
trade program) [https://perma.unl.edu/25BD-D3HM]. Both approaches encourage
cost-effective emissions abatement. See OFFICE OF POL’Y, ECON., & INNOVATION,
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES WITH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR PROTECTING THE
ENVIRONMENT ii–iii (identifying advantages of market-based approaches to pollu-
tion control). Whether a permit system or a tax is the optimal policy depends
upon case-specific factors. See Luca Taschini et al., Carbon Tax v Cap-and-Trade:
Which Is Better?, GUARDIAN (Jan. 31, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/envi-
ronment/2013/jan/31/carbon-tax-cap-and-trade [https://perma.unl.edu/EB96-
35EN]; see generally Lawrence H. Goulder & Andrew R. Schein, Carbon Taxes
Versus Cap and Trade: A Critical Review, CLIMATE CHANGE ECON., Nov. 18, 2013,
https://web.stanford.edu [https://perma.unl.edu/L6C4-3NE9].
187. Sweden and Finland adopted such taxes in the early 1990s. Where Carbon Is
Taxed, CARBON TAX CTR., http://www.carbontax.org/where-carbon-is-taxed/
[https://perma.unl.edu/8H7W-CSNJ]. Ireland implemented a carbon tax in 2010
(and used carbon tax revenue to offset declining income tax revenues during the
Great Recession). Frank Convery, Budget 2013 – Three Cheers for the Carbon
Tax, PUB. POL’Y.IE (Sept. 21, 2012), http://www.publicpolicy.ie/budget-2013-three-
cheers-for-the-carbon-tax/ [https://perma.unl.edu/TUQ2-GRYZ]. Two Canadian
provinces have also implemented a Carbon Tax. British Columbia/Canada, CAR-
BON TAX CTR., http://www.carbontax.org/where-carbon-is-taxed/british-columbia/
[https://perma.unl.edu/2VAG-Y7WL].
188. See Roberta F. Mann, Federal, State, and Local Tax Policies for Climate Change:
Coordination or Cross-Purpose?, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 369, 389 (2011)
(“State and local governments will likely be significantly involved in climate ad-
aptation measures, as droughts and floods resulting from climate change have
differing impacts across the nation.”); Deborah Salon et al., City Carbon Budgets:
A Proposal to Align Incentives for Climate-Friendly Communities, 38 ENERGY
POL’Y 2032 (2010) (proposing a mechanism to decrease greenhouse gas emissions
through city policy changes to encourage greener building and less driving).
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the United States to enact a carbon tax,189 while the Bay Area Air
Quality Management District imposed regional carbon pricing in
2008.190
Boulder’s tax, called the climate action plan (CAP) tax raises al-
most $2 million in revenue every year. The city uses this revenue to
fund “programs and services designed to reduce local greenhouse gas
emissions” by “encouraging residents and businesses to reduce energy
waste, save money on energy costs over time, and minimize reliance
on external energy sources.”191 Boulder first implemented its carbon
charges in 2007, and voters renewed the tax in November 2015.192
Boulder levies the tax based on energy usage. For residential electric
users, the average tax is only $21 a year, while for commercial users,
the average tax is $94, and for industrial users, the average tax is
$9,600.193 These averages reflect differences in energy use. The tax
rate per kilowatt used is highest for residential users.194 The tax is
collected by Boulder’s energy company, and consumers who elect to
receive a portion of their electricity from wind are not taxed on that
portion of energy consumption.195
Washington, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts have also consid-
ered charging for carbon emissions, though those efforts have stalled.
In 2016, Washington voters rejected Initiative 732, which would have
imposed a statewide carbon tax.196 Observers blame this, in part, on
the inability of carbon tax advocates to agree on a single proposal.197
Supporters of the tax have vowed to renew their efforts, but a legisla-
tive effort to impose the tax died in early 2018.198 The Rhode Island
189. Nicole Beletsky, Municipalities Join the Great Debates on Cap and Trade, and
Carbon Taxes, FORDHAM URB. L.J. (Mar. 25, 2014), http://urbanlawjournal.com/
municipalities-join-the-great-debates-on-cap-and-trade-and-carbon-taxes/ [https:/
/perma.unl.edu/6RAM-346D].
190. JENNY SUMNER ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., CARBON TAXES: A REVIEW
OF EXPERIENCE AND POLICY DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 17 (2009), http://
www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/47312.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/5357-Q253].
191. Boulder’s Climate Action Plan (CAP), CITY OF BOULDER, https://www.bouldercolo-
rado.gov/docs/City_of_Boulder-_Climate_Action_Plan_Handout_2015-1-2015082
61630.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/QL2P-XA9C].
192. Climate Action Tax, CITY OF BOULDER, https://bouldercolorado.gov/climate/cli
mate-action-plan-cap-tax [https://perma.unl.edu/XCC3-DPHM].
193. Id.
194. Id. ($0.0049/kWh for residential; $0.0009/kWh for commercial; and $0.0003/kWh
for industrial electricity users).
195. Id.
196. Lewis Kamb, Washington Voters Reject Initiative to Impose Carbon Tax on Fossil
Fuels, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/
politics/carbon-emissions-tax-initiative-732/ [https://perma.unl.edu/YR3C-
E7DU].
197. Id.
198. Washington State’s Carbon-Tax Bill Dies in Legislature, SEATTLE TIMES (March 2,
2018), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/washington-states-car
bon-tax-bill-dies-in-legislature/ [https://perma.unl.edu/RTD6-ZT8X].
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and Massachusetts proposals are both legislative efforts, and while
there seemed to have been momentum behind both proposals, efforts
to enact the legislative proposals have stalled.199 In addition, Mont-
gomery County, Maryland, briefly attempted to impose a carbon tax
on large emitters but repealed the tax when it came under legal
attack.200
3. Emissions Taxes Under State Law
Most carbon tax proposals assume that such policies need to be en-
acted pursuant to state or local taxing authority. Boulder, for exam-
ple, enacted its CAP tax subject to the strictures of Colorado’s
Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights (TABOR).201 The CAP tax, as described
above, functions as an excise tax on the purchase of electricity gener-
ated by carbon. As required by TABOR, the tax was approved by voter
initiative. Those implementing the CAP tax chose to seek voter ap-
proval to avoid the legal challenges that might have arisen had Boul-
der’s city council adopted the CAP program as a fee.202 Proposals to
enact carbon taxes in Washington State assumed that these carbon
taxes would be treated as taxes under state law.203 While news cover-
age of the Rhode Island proposal called it a carbon tax, the legislative
language introduced in the House suggested carbon pricing was, in
fact, a fee.204
199. Alex Kuffner, Carbon Taxing Proposal Back Before the General Assembly, PROVI-
DENCE J. (Feb. 2, 2017), http://www.providencejournal.com/news/20170202/car-
bon-taxing-proposal-back-before-general-assembly [https://perma.unl.edu/L4DL-
6HHA]; Bruce Gellerman, A ‘Tax’ or ‘the Cost of Pollution’? Mass. Debates
Surcharge on Fossil Fuels, WBUR (Sept. 19, 2017), http://www.wbur.org/bosto-
nomix/2017/09/19/massachusetts-surcharge-fossil-fuels [https://perma.unl.edu/
RHG3-G9C6].
200. Michael Laris & Michael Birnbaum, Montgomery County Raises Various Taxes,
WASH. POST (May 20, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ar-
ticle/2010/05/19/AR2010051904923.html [https://perma.unl.edu/GV8M-RZ5Y];
Montgomery Cty., Md., Res. 17-484 (July 10, 2012) https://www.montgomery
countymd.gov/council/resources/files/res/2012/20120710_17-484.pdf [https://
perma.unl.edu/9HB6-38TN].
201. COLO. CONST. Art. X, § 20.
202. CAROLYN BROUILLARD & SARA VAN PELT, A COMMUNITY TAKES CHARGE: BOUL-
DER’S CARBON TAX 7 (2007), https://www-static.bouldercolorado.gov/docs/commu-
nity-takes-charge-boulders-carbon-tax-1-201305081136.pdf [https://perma.
unl.edu/LJU4-ACRL].
203. Robinson Meyer, Maybe Blue States Won’t Take Serious Action on Climate
Change, ATLANTIC (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/
2018/03/carbon-tax-fails-in-washington-blue-states-climate-change/554693/
[https://perma.unl.edu/6TMF-HK4C] (describing a Washington state legislative
proposal as a tax of $12 per ton of carbon emissions).
204. Kuffner, supra note 199; The Energize Rhode Island: Clean Energy Investment
and Carbon Pricing Act of 2017, H. 5369 2017 Gen. Assemb. (R.I. 2017).
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Because Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker opposed tax in-
creases, legislators in that state proposed imposing carbon pricing as a
fee.205 Journalists covering the proposal repeatedly noted that, as a
legal matter, the program would establish a fee and not a tax. For
example, one journalist reported, “The rebate provision ensures that
legally, it is a fee, not a tax.”206 Boston’s public radio station observed,
“Under Barrett’s proposal, residents would get a check from the pro-
ceeds of the carbon fee. Under state law, it’s not a tax because the
money would not go to general revenue, but would go directly back to
taxpayers.”207
The Massachusetts Senate bill proposed a carbon emissions
“charge” of $10 per ton of CO2 the first year, which will increase by $5
each year until it reaches $40 per ton.208 The revenue would be re-
turned to residents and employers as rebates calculated by the com-
missioner of energy.209
To date, no state court has considered whether a carbon tax policy
could be adopted pursuant to a government’s fee authority. Whether
such a claim would be successful depends both on the specifics of the
program and on state law. For example, Boulder’s carbon tax was ex-
plicitly designed to raise general revenue and in implementing the
proposal, city staff considered a wide variety of revenue options. Such
legislative history would make it more difficult to pass muster as a
fee.
However, to the extent that the goal of carbon pricing is primarily
to regulate behavior (and not to raise revenue), and to the extent that
revenue is targeted toward efforts aimed at reducing carbon emis-
sions, there is a strong argument under the general revenue approach
that carbon pricing is not a tax, but rather a fee imposed pursuant to a
regulatory policy.
Many of the factors in the multi-factor approach suggest that a
properly designed carbon-pricing program could be considered a fee,
depending, as always, on how these factors are interpreted under spe-
cific state law. For example, the carbon fee is voluntary to the extent
that emitters can also choose to reduce their emissions and lower their
tax burden. The choice between reducing emissions and paying a car-
bon fee is certainly more voluntary than the option faced by Michigan
pawnbrokers in USA Cash #1, Inc. v. City of Saginaw, who had to
205. S. 1821, 190th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2017).
206. Shira Schoenberg, Environmentalists Push Carbon Fee in Massachusetts, MASS
LIVE (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.masslive.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/10/environ
mentalists_push_carbon.html [https://perma.unl.edu/W89D-JR7N].
207. Fred Thys, With Mass. Off Track on Emissions Goal, Advocates Seek 1st State
Carbon Tax, WBUR (Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.wbur.org/news/2015/03/12/mas
sachusetts-carbon-tax-proposal [https://perma.unl.edu/WEG9-NN35].
208. S. 1747, 189th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. § 3 (Mass. 2015).
209. Id.
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either pay the challenged tax or reduce their business operations
significantly.210
The difficulty of classifying carbon pricing as a fee is that, unlike
other traditional user fees, carbon taxes can collect significant reve-
nues, and spending this revenue only on areas with an obvious nexus
with the program may make little sense. The carbon tax itself may
accomplish a significant private-sector shift in greenhouse gas emis-
sions, and spending the majority of dollars raised chasing this same
goal may not be a particularly effective use of additional money, espe-
cially given the opportunity to reduce other taxes or fund other
programs.
Massachusetts’s climate advocates, noting this problem, attempted
to craft a revenue neutral carbon-pricing program. Under this propo-
sal, carbon-pricing revenues would offset other tax cuts. Consultants
suggested that this would make the proposal more fee-like, though the
consultants also noted that the carbon-pricing model may require a
new category.211
Recent California litigation suggests that courts may also struggle
to categorize other types of carbon pricing policies. The California
Chamber of Commerce (among other plaintiffs) challenged Califor-
nia’s emissions permit auction as an unlawful tax, put in place with-
out the supermajority support required to impose new taxes under
California law.212 Both the trial and appeals courts that heard this
claim rejected it and the California Supreme Court refused certio-
rari.213 However, district and appellate courts used strikingly differ-
ent frameworks for reaching this result and comparing the two
opinions suggests the continuing confusion surrounding the definition
of “tax.” Further, because Proposition 26 was passed after the legisla-
tive authorization of the carbon auction, both courts refused to con-
sider the carbon auction under its broad definition of tax.214 A closer
look at the two court opinions suggests the ways in which the tax ver-
sus user fee distinction fails to clarify carbon-pricing policies.
The California district court readily admitted that it found the auc-
tion pricing had similarities to both taxes and to fees.215 The district
210. See supra subsection II.C.2.
211. MARC BRESLOW ET AL., MASS. DEP’T OF ENERGY RESOURCES, ANALYSIS OF A CAR-
BON FEE OR TAX AS A MECHANISM TO REDUCE GHG EMISSIONS IN MASSACHUSETTS
41–42 (2014).
212. Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 216 Cal. Rptr. 3d 694, 699–700
(Ct. App. 2017), cert. denied, (2017).
213. Id. at 719–20; Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., No. 34-2012-
8001313, 2013 WL 12204350 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 2, 2013).
214. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 216 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 719–20; Cal. Air Res. Bd., 2013 WL
12204350, at *18–19.
215. Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., No. 34-2012-8001313, 2013 WL
12108277, at *5 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Aug. 28, 2013).
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court ultimately concluded that under Sinclair Paint, the auction was
closer to a regulatory fee than a tax since it was seeking to regulate
behavior.216
The California appellate court, in a split 2–1 opinion, also declined
to hold that the auction was an unlawful tax.217 The appellate court,
however, did not base its decision on Sinclair Paint. Rather the court
held that while Sinclair does distinguish regulatory fees from taxes, it
does not provide an exclusive test for determining when the state is
using its police power rather than its taxing authority, and as the
court noted, the carbon auction was not really a regulatory fee because
it was not trying to recoup costs incurred by the state as a result of a
payor’s activities.218
Rather, in determining the auction as something other than a tax,
the court held that the hallmarks of a non-tax payment are its volun-
tariness and the payor’s receipt of a benefit.219 The court found the
payment was voluntary because businesses had many options other
than purchasing emissions permits at auction: they could reduce their
emissions via investments in improved technology, they could pay
emissions permits on the post-auction market, they could bank emis-
sions from prior years, and they could receive emissions credits from
reductions in emissions from activities in non-covered sectors.220 The
court also found the emissions permits conferred a benefit on the
payors: the license to emit pollutants.221 The court rejected the plain-
tiff’s contention that the permits only conferred on them the ability to
do something they already had the legal right to do. As the court
noted, the litigants had no vested legal right to continue polluting and
that California could have decided to limit pollutants rather than pro-
vide for an emissions auction.222
It some sense, the appellate court’s opinion provides clear guidance
to policymakers attempting to craft carbon pricing policies in Califor-
nia going forward: voluntariness is key. Nevertheless, it remains un-
clear whether such interpretations can survive under Proposition 26.
In part, this confusion stems from the basic mismatch between ex-
isting tax and user fee doctrine and Pigovian theory. Government pric-
ing designed as a regulatory tool fits neither the classic definition of a
tax nor the classic definition of a regulatory fee since emissions pricing
may vastly exceed the cost of implementing the emissions regulatory
216. See Cal. Air Res. Bd., 2013 WL 12204350, at *27.
217. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 216 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 720.
218. Id. at 720.
219. Id. at 721.
220. Id. at 722.
221. Id. at 725.
222. See id. at 726 (quoting Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 180 (Ct. App.
2004)).
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regime. Similar conceptual confusion has bedeviled at least two courts
considering stormwater remediation fees.
B. Stormwater Remediation Fees
1. Stormwater Remediation Fees in Theory and Practice
After a rainstorm, the air often feels cleaner. The rain absorbs pol-
lutants in the air, washing them out of the sky.223 Natural ground
cover (a fancy way of saying dirt) absorbs rainwater, and this dirt fil-
ters out the pollutants before they enter waterways.224 Unfortunately,
the built environment, including buildings, roads, and parking lots,
often reduces this natural ground cover, replacing permeable dirt with
impermeable surfaces like asphalt and roofing materials. As a result,
rain “washes sediment, pathogens, and metals into surface waters,
impairing the nation’s rivers, streams, and coastal shorelines.”225
This stormwater runoff is the second biggest source of water pollution
in the United States.226
The Clean Water Act required the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to regulate stormwater discharge and the EPA imple-
mented this requirement in phases.227 In 1990, the EPA began Phase
I, which required large and medium municipal sewer systems be per-
mitted.228 In 1999, Phase II brought smaller municipal sewers into
the permit system.229
Traditionally, funding for stormwater management came from lo-
cal property taxes or a stormwater surcharge on local water bills.230
But building the infrastructure to comply with the Clean Water Act’s
223. See Jennifer Chu, Can Rain Clean the Atmosphere, MASS. INST. TECH. NEWS (Aug.
28, 2015), http://news.mit.edu/2015/rain-drops-attract-aerosols-clean-air-0828
[https://perma.unl.edu/4UB3-WFGQ] (discussing MIT research on the ways rain
washes aerosols out of the atmosphere). In fact, the California drought has in-
creased air pollution problems in the state. See Cal. Air Quality Affected by Lack
of Rain, NPR (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/01/22/264742844/calif-air-
quality-affected-by-lack-of-rain.
224. See generally DENNIS JURRIES, STATE OF OR. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, BI-
OFILTERS (BIOSWALES, VEGETATIVE BUFFERS, & CONSTRUCTED WETLANDS) FOR
STORM WATER DISCHARGE POLLUTION REMOVAL (2003) (discussing, inter alia,
ways to decrease pollution in run-off).
225. Samuel L. Brown & Gerard Olson, Stormwater—The Next Phase, 30 NAT. RE-
SOURCES & ENV’T, 53, 53 (2016).
226. Avi Brisman, Considerations in Establishing a Stormwater Utility, 26 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 505, 505 (2002).
227. Water Quality Act of 1987, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (2012).
228. Stormwater Discharges from Municipal Sources, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/
npdes/stormwater-discharges-municipal-sources#overview [https://perma.
unl.edu/8XXJ-5WX5].
229. Id.
230. CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ACTION FUND, RAISE NEEDED REVENUE EFFICIENTLY AND
FAIRLY 153 (2014), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/01/
COW_05RaiseNeededRevenue.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/9QQX-HGBF].
206 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:168
mandates required local governments to make significant capital in-
vestments to manage growth and modernize existing systems.231 To
pay for all of this investment, many local governments have turned to
an alternate source of financing: stormwater remediation fees.232
These fees are assessed based on a property’s impervious surface area,
linking the amount of runoff a property generates to the cost of
remediating that runoff.
Many governments treat the stormwater remediation fees much
like other utility bills. Local Philadelphia, described as the “the gold
standard” for stormwater management,233 adds its Stormwater Man-
agement Service Charge to properties’ water bills—describing the
charge as a “utility fee” on its website.234 Seattle’s stormwater man-
agement fees are collected as part of a combined water-sewer-garbage
charge, and stormwater management is conducted by a combined
sewer-stormwater utility.235 Other local governments have created a
separate stormwater utility to manage the problem.236
2. Stormwater Remediation Fees Under State Law
According to one scholar, lawsuits challenging stormwater fees as
disguised taxes are the most common legal obstacle to funding
stormwater remediation.237 The majority of state courts hearing these
challenges have upheld stormwater fees as user fees.238 However, two
states have found them to be disguised taxes.239 At least one federal
court has found the fee to be a tax for purposes of tribal sovereign
immunity,240 while another found it to be a user fee for purposes of
the TIA.241 Even courts that upheld remediation fees as user fees
have struggled with how to fit them into existing doctrine.
231. Id.
232. Brisman, supra note 226, at 507.
233. CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ACTION FUND, supra note 230, at 153.
234. Residential Stormwater Billing, CITY OF PHILA., http://www.phila.gov/water/wu/
stormwater/Pages/ResidentialSWBilling.aspx [https://perma.unl.edu/RQ98-
3SJD].
235. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 35.67.010; 35.67.331 (2013).
236. See C. Warren Campbell, et al., Western Kentucky University Stormwater Utility
Survey (2017) (surveying stormwater utilities by state).
237. Brisman, supra note 226, at 520.
238. Substitute Brief of the National Association of Clean Water Agencies et. al.,
supra note 10, at *3.
239. See Bolt v. City of Lansing, 587 N.W.2d 264, 266 (Mich. 1998) (finding
stormwater user charge was a tax and not a fee); Zweig v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer
Dist., 412 S.W.3d 223, 226–27 (Mo. 2013) (finding stormwater user charge was a
tax, rather than a fee).
240. Oneida Tribe of Indians v. Vill. of Hobart, 732 F.3d 837, 842 (7th Cir. 2013) (find-
ing a stormwater runoff assessment to be a tax, rather than a fee).
241. Homewood Vill., LLC, v. Unified Gov’t of Athens-Clarke Cty., 132 F. Supp.3d
1376, 1381 (M.D. Ga 2015) (finding a county stormwater ordinance created a fee
rather than a tax for purposes of the TIA).
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Utility bills are classic user fees. Consumers of municipal services
are paying for the marginal cost of municipally-provided trash collec-
tion, electricity, water, or sewer services plus the consumer share of
capital costs. Stormwater remediation does not directly benefit a prop-
erty owner in the same way as trash collection, electricity, water, or
sewer connections. While the municipality as a whole benefits from
compliance with the EPA’s permitting requirements under the Clean
Water Act, individual property owners do not benefit from this compli-
ance. In fact, because water drains to the lowest point, the pollutants
in stormwater runoff often end up affecting areas outside municipal
boundaries.242 This explains the need for federal legislation: adequate
stormwater drainage benefits the entire water basin community by
ensuring cleaner waterways.
A close look at a successful challenge to a stormwater remediation
fee illustrates the ways courts can struggle in applying user fee doc-
trine. In Bolt v. City of Lansing, the Michigan Supreme Court ad-
dressed the validity of Lansing’s stormwater remediation fees. These
fees were designed to be roughly commensurate with the amount of
stormwater runoff from the subject property.243 For commercial par-
cels, industrial parcels, and residential parcels greater than two acres,
the fee was based on the ratio of impervious to pervious surfaces.244
Residential parcels smaller than two acres were charged a flat fee be-
cause the administrative costs of making individualized determina-
tions were prohibitive.245 However, any property owner could install
its own alternate rainwater collection system and seek an exemption
from the fee.246
Michigan requires local governments to subject taxes to a “vote of
the people,” though local governments can impose user fees and regu-
latory fees through normal ordinance procedures.247 The Michigan
Supreme Court held that the stormwater remediation fee was a “tax”
under Michigan law, and therefore invalid because the city had not
held a vote.248
242. Flooding & Pollution, Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., http://www.noaa.gov/
resource-collections/watersheds-flooding-pollution [https://perma.unl.edu/UMJ3-
NSW6] (“The blotches of leaked motor oil on parking lots, plastic grocery bags,
pesticides, fertilizers, detergents, and sediments are known as non-point source
pollutants. If untreated, these pollutants wash directly into waterways carried by
runoff from rain and snow melt. These contaminants can infiltrate groundwater
and concentrate in streams and rivers and can be carried down the watershed
and into the ocean.”).
243. Bolt, 587 N.W.2d at 267.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 278 (Boyle, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 266.
248. Id.
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The Michigan court considered whether the levy (1) “serve[d] a reg-
ulatory purpose rather than a revenue-raising purpose,” (2) was “pro-
portionate” to the benefit conferred, and (3) was in some sense
voluntary.249 The court found that the fee served a revenue raising
purpose because it was designed to recover the cost of capital expendi-
tures involved in installing the stormwater treatment equipment over
a time period shorter than the useful life of the investment.250 The
court found this feature meant “the ‘fee’ [was] not structured to simply
defray the costs of a ‘regulatory’ activity, but rather to fund a public
improvement designed to provide a long-term benefit to the city and
all its citizens.”251 Moreover, as the court noted, Lansing only needed
new infrastructure for one quarter of city parcels, but the fee was lev-
ied against all property owners. The court held that because the fee
was not targeted exclusively at those who benefited, it was neither
proportional nor imposed for a regulatory purpose.252 Further, the
court found the fee “lack[ed] . . . a significant element of regulation”
because the fee calculation did not look at individual property factors
(like pollutants present on the property).253 Finally, the court found
the fee compulsory because property owners had no choice about
whether to use the service.254
Three justices dissented. Rather than focusing narrowly on
whether the fee allowed the city to recoup its capital expenditures too
quickly, the dissent would have determined whether it had a “reve-
nue-raising purpose” by looking to whether Lansing officials
earmarked the money for the service charged.255
Further, as the dissent noted, Lansing officials designed the fee to
be proportional to the harm imposed by landowners. On larger par-
cels, the fee varied based on the ratio of impermeable to pervious land
acreage to permeable acreage, recognizing that pervious surfaces did
not contribute to the runoff problem. Administrative costs limited
such tailoring for smaller, residential parcels, but as the dissent ar-
gued “[c]onsidering the fee method as a whole, the city used a logical
system to compute the proportionate amount of runoff that each par-
cel contributes to the overall system.”256 This was especially true be-
cause landowners could petition (and had successfully petitioned) for
credits against the fee based on their ability to independently collect
stormwater.257 The dissent suggested this was evidence that the fee
249. Id. at 269.
250. Id. at 270–71.
251. Id. at 270.
252. Id. at 271.
253. Id. at 272.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 276 (Boyle, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 277.
257. Id. at 278.
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was both proportionate and voluntary, especially under Michigan’s ex-
pansive understanding of voluntariness.258
As Darien Shanske has observed, rather than see the parallels be-
tween Lansing’s stormwater remediation fee program and traditional
user fees, the Bolt majority struggled unnecessarily with the idea that
Lansing’s stormwater fee rates required all landowners to share the
capital costs of the system, even when that capital improvement did
not directly benefit their property.259 Of course, failing to make those
capital improvements would have increased the costs of running the
system for everyone, as all local taxpayers would be responsible for
the legal fees associated with a municipal violation of the Clean Water
Act.
The majority struggled to fit stormwater remediation into the defi-
nition of user fees in part because user fee doctrine does not readily
lend itself to pricing externalities. And in some rough sense, that is
what stormwater remediation attempts to do. The externality is the
stormwater runoff—the result of property development. Further, the
majority failed to appreciate the significance of the exemption for
property owners who install their own drainage systems. While the
majority correctly noted that the benefits of storm drainage are dif-
fuse, it failed to appreciate that the harms caused by stormwater run-
off are traceable to specific property owners and that Lansing’s pricing
system attempts to trace these costs in an administratively efficient
manner.
IV. A NEW WAY FORWARD
As I suggested in Part III, Pigovian taxation and other regulatory
levies do not fit neatly into either the tax or user fee categories as
defined under existing doctrine. In this Part, I suggest a new approach
to defining these categories. This new approach would clarify existing
doctrinal confusion and provide more predictability to policymakers
and litigators.
In the first section of Part IV, I summarize the problems with ex-
isting user fee doctrine. In the second, I describe my proposal in detail.
In the third, I address some criticisms of my proposal.
A. The Need for Reform
Existing user fee doctrine is messy. In close cases, decisions are
unpredictable. This ambiguity causes two problems. First, it creates
legal uncertainty surrounding important sources of revenue and the
programs they fund. For example, Arizona funded its Medicaid expan-
258. Id.
259. Darien Shanske, Interpreting State Fiscal Constitutions: A Modest Proposal,
RUTGERS L. REV. (forthcoming).
210 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:168
sion with revenue from a user fee assessed against large hospitals by
the state’s health department. Lawmakers opposed to Medicaid ex-
pansion challenged this hospital assessment as a disguised tax en-
acted without the supermajority approval required by Arizona law.260
While the Arizona Supreme Court ultimately upheld the hospital as-
sessment as a valid tax, the case demonstrates how the fate of an im-
portant state policy might turn on whether its state courts determine
that an assessment is a tax.261 As the defendant told the Arizona Su-
preme Court during oral argument, its decision about the constitu-
tionality of the assessment could potentially cause several hundred
thousand Arizona residents to lose health insurance.262 And it seems
impossible to believe that the policy stakes of their decision did not
impact the court’s ultimate legal conclusion.
Second, this uncertainty may discourage policy innovation even
where a state or local government has the authority to act. Policymak-
ers and legislators may simply think the likelihood of litigation is too
great to be worth the candle of legislation and implementation.
Given these problems, one might be tempted to simply end the tax
or user fee distinction, at least in certain contexts. I have argued else-
where in favor of granting municipalities greater taxing authority,263
and there is a voluminous literature criticizing the consequences of
laws that make it harder to pass tax increases.264 If user fees were
subject to the same legal and procedural requirements as taxes,
clearly delineating the line between the two would be an interesting,
but ultimately unimportant, exercise.
260. Ken Alltucker, Court Rejects Arizona GOP Lawmakers’ Medicaid Challenge,
AZCENTRAL (Mar. 16, 2017), http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/arizo
na/2017/03/16/arizona-appeals-court-rejects-gop-lawmakers-medicaid-challenge/
99258714/ [https://perma.unl.edu/N2XC-U39J].
261. Biggs v. Betlach, 404 P.3d 1243 (Ariz. 2017) (upholding the constitutionality of
the assessment under a three-factor test derived from the San Juan Cellular
factors).
262. Alexandra Olgin, AZ Supreme Court Hears Arguments About Whether to Drop
Medicaid Expansion Lawsuit; KJZZ (Nov. 6, 2014), http://theshow.kjzz.org/node/
64408 [https://perma.unl.edu/W9U3-3K3M].
263. Cf. Scharff, supra note 12.
264. See THERESE J. MCGUIRE & KIM S. RUEBEN, THE COLORADO REVENUE LIMIT: THE
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TABOR, (2006), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/
publication/50226/1000940-The-Colorado-Revenue-Limit.PDF [https://
perma.unl.edu/7XJD-BZZC]; ARTHUR O’SULLIVAN, TERRI A. SEXTON, & STEVEN M.
SHEFFRIN, PROPERTY TAXES AND TAX REVOLTS: THE LEGACY OF PROPOSITION 13
(1995); Terri A. Sexton, Steven M. Sheffrin, & Arthur O’Sullivan, Proposition 13:
Unintended Effects and Feasible Reforms, 52 NAT’L TAX J. 99 (1999). But see The-
rese J. McGuire, Proposition 13 and Its Offspring: For Good or for Evil?, 52 NAT’L
TAX J. 129 (1999); Iris J. Lav & Erica Williams, A Formula for Decline: Lessons
from Colorado for States Considering TABOR, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORI-
TIES (Mar. 15, 2010), http://www.cbpp.org/research/a-formula-for-decline-lessons-
from-colorado-for-states-considering-tabor [https://perma.unl.edu/697S-PXGR].
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Nevertheless, the current political landscape makes such reforms
unlikely. Efforts to roll back laws limiting tax authority have not had
much success.265 And in the meantime, judges must still confront
cases raising these distinctions.
Even if state law were to eliminate the distinction between taxes
and user fees for the purposes of municipal authority and
supermajority requirements, courts would still need to categorize le-
vies. State courts would still need to know whether a particular levy
was a fee, which could be assessed against a tax-exempt entity, or a
tax, which could not be so assessed.
Noting the confusion surrounding user fees under state law, Da-
rien Shankse has also suggested some reforms of the doctrine.266
Shankse notes that courts attempting to distinguish user fees from
taxes often get distracted by the relationship between the govern-
ment’s charge and the benefit conferred on the user. As Shanske ob-
serves, however, there are many administrative reasons (and basic
economic explanations) for why precision is difficult, if not impossible.
He therefore proposes that courts engage in a procedural review, look-
ing less at the substance of the ratemaking process and more at the
processes the government used in setting rates. I am sympathetic to
his proposal, as it would clearly improve current doctrine. His propo-
sal, however, does not clarify what kinds of costs the government
should be allowed to consider.
As I argue more fully below, courts should explicitly recognize dif-
ferences between different kinds of user fees. Recognizing the variety
of user fees governments charge would bring needed clarity to state
court efforts to distinguish taxes and user fees and would allow courts
to take a more sensible approach to charges based on Pigovian princi-
ples.267 Absent the recognition of the disparate types of user fees,
courts will continue to struggle with distinguishing taxes and user
fees.
B. The Proposal
I propose a new framework for courts to use as they attempt to
distinguish taxes from user fees. While this proposal builds upon ex-
isting state law, I argue that courts should adopt a new framework
that explicitly recognizes the variety of user fees charged and develop
265. C.f. Williamson, supra note 31 (discussing the frequency with which voters actu-
ally improve rate increases at the local level to pay for local infrastructure
improvements).
266. Shanske, supra note 26, at 1345–49.
267. Hugh Spitzer has made similar suggestions for reform of Washington State’s user
fee law, but my proposal focuses explicitly on the problems of Pigovian taxation.
See Spitzer, supra note 35, at 336.
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tests that reflect these differences.268 Courts should recognize that
benefit charges are only one kind of user fee and in analyzing other
kinds of user fees, the benefit conferred to the payor may be less obvi-
ous. The law works reasonably well for classic user fees, but it works
far less well when governments move beyond these types of fees.
Single-factor approaches are often too narrowly focused. For exam-
ple, consider how one should analyze state fuel taxes under a general-
revenue test. Almost all states earmark fuel tax receipts for highway
repairs—repairs that benefit the motorists paying the fuel tax. Under
the general revenue approach, fuel taxes are really fees, especially in
states that place the fuel tax receipts in a segregated State Highway
Fund.269
More broadly, the problem with the general revenue approach is
that government revenues are fungible and all fees are levied, at least
in part, to provide revenue. It is hardly satisfying for a court to con-
clude that some government charge is a fee because the money doesn’t
go to that government’s general revenue when collecting this fee al-
lows the government to collect less general revenue.
Similar opacity infects the multi-factor tests. This opacity exists
because state laws designed to distinguish between user fees and
taxes have never caught up with the multiplicity of charges now col-
lected and levied by governments. In an era of simpler government
budgets and more limited government activity, the general revenue
approach may have adequately policed the line between taxes and
user fees.
Consider a court analyzing a local law imposing a charge on the
sale of alcohol. A court might reasonably conclude that if the collected
charge goes into an account dedicated to enforcing regulations on the
sale of alcohol, it is a regulatory fee designed to force consumers to pay
for the cost of policing alcohol consumption. However, if that same
charge went into the city’s general revenue fund, and thus provided
financial support to a broad array of government services, the charge
begins to look more like an excise tax. This assumption would be
stronger if prior to the imposition of the fee, the government did little
to regulate the sale of alcohol. As governments have become more so-
268. See id. at 353–54.
269. JAIME RALL, ET AL., TRANSPORTATION GOVERNANCE AND FINANCE xiii (2011) http://
www.ncsl.org/documents/transportation/FULL-REPORT.pdf [https://perma.unl.
edu/N5EG-Z6A4] (“For example, 23 states have constitutional provisions—and
three have statutory provisions—that restrict use of state fuel tax revenues ex-
clusively to highway and road purposes. Most other states dedicate these and
other transportation-related revenues to general or multimodal transportation
purposes, with a few limited exceptions. In addition, 35 states reported they have
provisions that direct use of the funds or accounts to which transportation reve-
nues are deposited. At least six states also explicitly prohibit diversion or transfer
of transportation revenues to other purposes.”).
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phisticated and face pressure to shift funding of existing services and
programs to user fees, the importance of segregated accounts seems
less clear.
As I’ve suggested in Part III, these doctrinal problems are com-
pounded by the increasing variety of user fees that local governments
charge and the ways governments determine the amount charged. As
technology allows governments to calibrate the costs of providing par-
ticular services more precisely, courts have struggled with how fine-
grained such calibrations should be. For example, Darien Shankse ar-
gues that the Bolt court struggled to understand Lansing’s
stormwater charges as user fees because the capital infrastructure
costs of the system swamped the marginal costs of providing
stormwater remediation for individual properties.270 Of course, pri-
vate market prices are also not based purely on marginal costs of
production.
User fee doctrine should explicitly recognize the variety of charges
imposed under the rubric of user fees and the complexity of these fees.
In particular, courts should define user fees to include three types of
charges. The first category would encompass classic user fees, i.e. pay-
ments for government provided products or services. Following Hugh
Spitzer’s suggestions for Washington State, the second category would
be traditional regulatory fees. The final category would cover what I
term price-based regulatory tools.
1. Classic User Fees
Classic user fees involve prices charged when a government is act-
ing in a proprietary capacity similar to a private company. Often, the
government lacks a monopoly or is providing a nonessential good.
Green Bay residents are not required by law (though some may feel
compelled by loyalty) to purchase Packers tickets. Similarly, users of
municipal swimming pools are not required to be there nor are visitors
to a county-run zoo.
Some levies, however, involve charges for services that the govern-
ment provides by monopoly (or close to it). These are charges for
things like municipally provided water, sewer connections, and trash
services.271
270. See Shanske, supra note 26, at 1350–51.
271. By including sewer connections as classic user fees, I am suggesting a broader
definition of the term than Hugh Spitzer, who would consider such charges bur-
den-offset charges. However, sewer fees provide a direct benefit to property own-
ers. Most city residents want a functioning sewage connection in their home. Our
sewer connection fees are payments for the service of having our waste treated at
a distance from our place of residence or work. These are not charges compensat-
ing for harms our actions impose on others.
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Under my proposed framework, charges paid in exchange for a gov-
ernment-provided service would be a user fee so long as the charge
approximately equals the government’s cost of providing that service.
For this purpose, a government’s cost of providing a service should
include both marginal costs and also a reasonable share of infrastruc-
ture costs.
Of course, there will remain some questions about how precise a fit
“approximately equally government costs” requires, but courts could
continue relying on existing doctrine to test this point. Alternatively,
courts could consider Darien Shanske’s proposal to test fitness by
looking at the methodology a government used in setting its fee rather
than evaluating the substance of the fee itself.272
In some sense, this category is meant to encompass the types of
charges that courts think of as model user fees (like municipal gar-
bage disposal charges and tolls) that are uncontroversially classified
as user fees. While theoretically such fees may be difficult to clearly
distinguish from taxes, courts usually have little trouble thinking of
such charges as conferring a benefit on the payor proportional to the
cost.
2. Traditional Regulatory Fees
Courts also allow governments to charge user fees to cover the
costs they incur in regulating a specific business activity or person.
Thus, licensing fees and inspection fees are valid user fees, what
Spitzer refers to as “true regulatory fees.”273 Such fees, however, fit
imperfectly with a benefits theory of user fees. While regulations often
do provide some benefits to regulated parties, many regulations are
designed to benefit not just the regulated entity and its customers but
also the broader public. For example, when we require residential
homes to be built to code, we are not just protecting homeowners but
also their neighbors from the dangers of shoddy construction work.
My proposal would not change the categorization of regulatory fees
under most state law. However, courts should more clearly articulate
this as a fee category, so as to clarify the role of “benefit” in the current
doctrine.
3. Price-Based Regulatory Tools
The most dramatic change in my proposal would be for courts to
recognize a new category of price-based regulatory tools that could
qualify as fees. In creating this new category, I am explicitly ex-
panding the concept of government-provided benefit to include the
government granting a license to create a social cost. As I argue below,
272. See Shanske supra note 26, at 1350.
273. Spitzer, supra note 35, at 349–50.
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there are a number of reasons why such a charge comes closer to a
user fee than a tax. Nevertheless, not all price-based regulations
should qualify as user fees. Rather, courts should consider placing
charges in this category under two circumstances.
First, policies can qualify as user fees if the government sets the
price so that it roughly approximates the externality cost. Second, pol-
icies can qualify as user fees if the government restricts the use of
proceeds from the fee to projects focused on abating the externality.
A disjunctive test is necessary because it provides local govern-
ments the opportunity to assess a user fee in situations where pre-
cisely measuring the externality cost would be cost-prohibitive, but
where the revenue raised from the fee is clearly allocated to remediat-
ing problems caused by the externality. At the same time, it offers
governments attempting to precisely calculate externality costs the
option of obtaining a double dividend by repurposing the revenue
raised from the user fee.274 Further, allowing governments to repur-
pose revenue may give policymakers more flexibility in dealing with
the distributional concerns raised by Pigovian levies. For example, to
the extent that carbon pricing may be regressive because low-income
households spend a greater portion of their income on utilities, gov-
ernments could create rebates and other programs to curb the impact
of carbon pricing on these households.275
Courts should treat priced-based regulatory tools as user fees for
three reasons. First, economically, they are more similar to user fees
than they are to taxes. Classical economic theory suggests self-inter-
ested buyers and self-interested sellers will collectively determine a
market clearing price, i.e. a price at which all goods produced by the
market will find willing buyers. This market clearing price is the “effi-
cient” price for the good because at that price both producers and con-
sumers benefit from the market transaction—no beneficial
transactions are left on the table.
When a government introduces a tax on a good or service, that tax
raises the price of the good. This drives a wedge between the price
consumers must pay for the good and the amount of revenue produc-
ers obtain from making and selling it. A portion of this wedge is reve-
nue for the government, but a portion of the wedge, known as
deadweight loss, consists of transactions that would have happened
274. See supra notes 169, 170, and accompanying text.
275. I’m once again indebted to Katie Pratt for reminding me that the double dividend
might be an efficiency payout, but it can also be used to improve equity. Of
course, the distributional effects of a carbon tax are quite complicated. The im-
pact on household energy costs is surely regressive, but the impacts on the trans-
portation sector are likely more heterogeneous. Upper-income drivers are more
likely to have newer, more fuel-efficient cars, but also to purchase bigger cars
than lower income drivers, and upper-income commuters are more likely to drive
than to use public transportation.
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but for the tax. For this reason, classical economics suggests taxes re-
duce market efficiency. Because of the tax, transactions that would
otherwise have benefitted both producers and consumers fail to take
place.276
Traditional user fees, in contrast, should produce no equivalent in-
efficiencies. The government is merely providing a service that a will-
ing buyer can pay for. The price the government charges, at least
theoretically, should accord with the market price of the good.
In this way, Pigovian policies begin to look more like user fees.
Pigovian policies seek to eradicate inefficiencies in the market. These
policies try to ensure that producers and consumers take into account
not only their costs but also the costs imposed on others. Pigovian the-
ory taxes these transactions because taking into account these social
costs, there are too many transactions happening, and the efficient
market would have fewer transactions. As a result, Pigovian taxation,
in theory, produces no deadweight loss—just like a classic user fee.
Second, like traditional user fees, Pigovian policies provide infor-
mation about the private value of the activity producing the negative
externality.277 For those payors willing to pay the Pigovian charge,
the private benefit outweighs the social cost. Under traditional user
fee doctrine, courts might evaluate this parallel under tests that con-
sider “voluntariness.” But as discussed above, evaluating voluntari-
ness directly leads to contorted analysis from state courts. Identifying
a category of “market-based” regulations allows courts to avoid such
contortions.
Third, and finally, these market-based regulatory fees are concep-
tually more similar to fees than taxes. Tax limitations treat a govern-
ment’s exercise of its taxing authority to raise revenue differently
than its policy power to regulate behavior. Price-based regulatory poli-
cies are designed to regulate behavior. Treating command-and-control
regulatory tools more favorably will distort state and local regulatory
choices. Governments may choose not to regulate or regulate using
more expensive command-and-control options because they lack the
authority to implement market-based regulatory tools.
Asking courts to distinguish between revenue and regulatory pur-
poses of a statute can be difficult if the charge is imposed for multiple
reasons. And governments are always thinking about revenue when
they impose user fees because money is fungible. Rather than ask the
revenue versus regulatory purpose question directly, as current law
276. Of course, the elimination of deadweight loss in these transactions depends on
certain assumptions about how the new tax interacts with other existing eco-
nomic distortions. Removing a single distortion may not always improve efficacy.
See R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV.
ECON. STUD. 11 (1956).
277. See Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 28, at 803–04.
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requires courts to do, my proposed definition asks courts to evaluate
the fit between the fee charged and how it was calculated.
Under my proposed definition of price-based regulatory tools, car-
bon-pricing programs could receive user fee treatment, so long as the
size of the fee is reasonably proportional to the costs imposed by the
payor’s emissions. Such carbon-pricing schemes could still qualify as
user fees even if the revenue earned from carbon pricing exceeds the
cost of administering the carbon-pricing program and is used for other
purposes, including reduction of other tax burdens.
To the extent all revenue is fungible, tying abatement costs to the
amount of the charge does not prove that the imposition of the charge
has no revenue purpose. Rather, in classifying such charges as user
fees, my goal is to provide an alternate way for localities to measure
the externality cost. Of course, it may be easier for governments to
limit the revenue collected from such fees to abatement costs and
thereby avoid litigation challenging its externality cost estimates. As I
discuss in subsection IV.C.3, determining “externality” costs is not a
straightforward proposition.
Not all environmental taxes would qualify for user fee treatment,
however. Boulder’s carbon tax would likely not qualify under either
prong. First, because the city charges the tax at a higher rate for resi-
dential than commercial users, it is hard to see how the city designed
the tax to match the cost of the externality. On a per-unit basis, car-
bon emitted by residential users contributes to climate change in the
exact same way as carbon emitted by residential users.278 And while
Boulder has invested the money raised through its carbon tax in its
climate action plan, this plan does not exclusively fund the direct costs
Boulder incurs in abating climate change. Rather, it funds a variety of
environmental programs that are only loosely tied to the abatement of
costs Boulder bears from climate change.
Similarly, few sin taxes would qualify as fees under this proposal.
Some have justified cigarette and alcohol taxes on Pigovian grounds,
and these taxes receive support in part because they may limit con-
sumption. However, such taxes have long played an important reve-
nue role, and these taxes are rarely used to fund targeted public
health investments, in part because the revenue raised by these taxes
may dwarf the public spending needs in these categories. In fact,
states have frequently raided Tobacco Settlement funds that were set
aside for such public health purposes to supplement general revenue
278. Some types of user fees do contain cross-subsidizations that charge different
rates for different types of users. Municipal electrical bills, for example, may
charge different rates to residential and commercial consumers. I think a stricter
standard needs to apply, however, to price-based regulatory tools because the
benefit conferred to the payor is more attenuated.
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shortfalls,279 and studies consistently show that governments are
most likely to raise taxes on cigarettes and alcohol during recessions
to offset lower revenues raised through other means.280 Further, stud-
ies suggest the external costs of tobacco consumption imposed on the
state and federal government is smaller than the tobacco taxes
themselves.281
Similarly, most soda taxes would be taxes rather than fees under
this proposal. Though advocates of soda taxes laud them as regulatory
tools, there is little evidence that any soda tax has been designed to
approximate the externality costs imposed by consuming soda.282 In
part, such soda taxes are difficult to implement because measuring
the externality cost is difficult and would likely vary by consumer.283
Further, some soda taxes are passed with specific revenue goals in
mind that are unrelated to the costs imposed by soda. Philadelphia’s
soda tax revenues are funding an expansion of the city’s preschool pro-
gram and other public works projects.284 Philadelphia’s mayor sug-
gested that his soda tax proposal “could raise more than $400 million
over five years, enough to fund not just universal preschool, but also
renovations to local libraries, parks and recreation centers; ‘commu-
nity schools’ that wrap social services with education; and cash for the
279. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TOBACCO SETTLEMENT: STATES’ USE OF
MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT PAYMENTS 26–28 (2001).
280. Richard H. Matoon & Sarah Wetmore, Sin Taxes: The Sobering Fiscal Reality,
339 FED. RES. BANK CHI. (2015), https://www.chicagofed.org/~/media/publications
/chicago-fed-letter/2015/cfl339-pdf.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/KM8W-C57G];
NICHOLAS JOHNSON, ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, STATE TAX
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troubled municipal pension program.”285 In other words, the funds re-
ceived are not being used to combat the public health costs of in-
creased sugar consumption, and so under the proposal Philadelphia
has implemented a soda tax and not a fee.
Berkeley’s soda tax would likely fail the user fee test, too. The reve-
nue from the Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Product Tax goes to the
city’s general revenue account.286 Though the tax also required the
city to appoint a group of experts in nutrition and public health to
provide an annual recommendation on how to use these revenues to
improve the health of Berkeley’s children, the city council has full dis-
cretion about whether to adopt these recommendations. As a result,
the funds are not reserved for abatement costs. Further, although
healthcare is more closely related to soda-consumption externalities
than preschool education, not all of the health problems facing Berke-
ley children are obesity-related, let alone related to increased sugar
consumption. Thus, the soda tax revenue is not exclusively targeted at
abating the problems caused by excess soda consumption.
By creating an explicit category of price-based regulatory fees, my
proposal offers greater predictability in user fee doctrine. Such pre-
dictability will create a legal environment that should encourage more
state and local governments to experiment with price-based regula-
tory fees. It will also better reflect the division between taxation and
other types of government charges because it will treat regulatory ac-
tivity different than government efforts to raise revenue.
C. Problems with the Proposal
1. Greater Revenue Authority Is Undesirable
To the extent the proposal broadens the definition of user fees, it
provides states and local governments greater revenue authority than
currently exists. As a result, one criticism of the proposal is that it
unnecessarily increases this revenue authority.
I have argued elsewhere that municipalities should have more ex-
pansive revenue authority, but there may be reasons to think other-
wise. Especially at the local level, increased authority may “contribute
to the pervasive privatism that is the hallmark of contemporary
285. Margot Sanger-Katz, Making a Soda Tax More Politically Palatable, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/04/upshot/making-a-soda-tax-
more-politically-palatable.html?action=click&contentCollection=the%20Upshot&
module=relatedCoverage&region=marginalia&pgtypearticle; see also Vauhini
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You, NEW YORKER (June 16, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/
theres-now-a-soda-tax-in-philadelphia-but-not-because-sugar-is-bad-for-you
[https://perma.unl.edu/K8Q5-AQHJ] (describing political battles over soda taxes).
286. Berkeley, Cal., Code tit. 7, ch. 7.72 (2018), http://www.code publishing.com/CA/
Berkeley/ [https://perma.unl.edu/X3NA-D8YY].
220 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:168
American politics.”287 As Laurie Reynolds has forcefully argued, rely-
ing on user fees rather than general taxation for government revenue
reduces the progressivity of public spending because an increasing
percentage of government services are provided only to those re-
sidents who can afford them.288
But classifying price-based regulatory tools as user fees does not
privatize government services. Rather, these price-based regulatory
tools do the opposite. They prevent the public from paying to mitigate
the public harms imposed by private actors.
Other critics may focus less on the privatization of government ser-
vices and more on contracting such services. In particular, small gov-
ernment advocates may view this proposal as a “stealth argument” for
giving governments more money. This proposal, however, creates few
“stealth” opportunities for governments.
In suggesting that courts delineate between three categories of
user fees, I am first trying to offer an intervention in the doctrine that
will reduce uncertainty among governments and payors. Litigation is
costly and unpredictable legal tests aid neither government nor
taxpayers.
Second, to the extent that the category of “price-based regulatory
tools” does expand the category of user fees, there is no reason to be-
lieve such fees could be imposed without significant public attention.
Of course, to the extent governments have more legal authority to en-
force user fees than taxes, my proposal will result in fewer legal obsta-
cles to enacting such policies. But legal obstacles are not the only
relevant constraint. Regulatory activity to control externality costs, ei-
ther by banning certain behavior or limiting it, would certainly be sub-
ject to significant scrutiny. I see little reason to believe that policies
seeking to price externalities would somehow evade the attention of
small government anti-regulatory activists. I am comfortable with the
political process working as a check on such undesirable expansion.
One advantage of current law is that it offers state courts the op-
portunity to use a single, consistent definition of user fee. There is
some complexity required by adding multiple types of tests, and under
this proposal there will surely be appeals based on whether courts ap-
plied the correct test for a particular type of fee.
Courts currently struggle to fit Pigovian levies within the doctrine,
creating exceptions or loosening definitions beyond recognizable
meanings.289 Making the rule clearer can sometimes mean adding
complexity, but that does not necessarily make the rule more difficult
287. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government
Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1990).
288. Reynolds, supra note 42.
289. See, e.g., supra notes 117–20 and accompanying text (discussing how Michigan
courts have interpreted a “voluntariness” standard).
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to apply. Trying to make a variety of charges match a one-size-fits-all
rule leads to instability in the doctrine.
2. Voter Preferences/Constitutional Interpretation
Another objection to the proposal is that it pushes back on the ex-
press wishes of voters, especially when it comes to political process
limitations enacted through popular referenda. Voters, at least in Cal-
ifornia, have repeatedly objected to the California courts’ narrow ap-
plication of tax limits.
As a substantive matter, it is not clear whether voters’ support for
broad definitions of taxes should extend to price-based regulatory fees.
Of course, it is possible that such support represents general anti-gov-
ernment zeal, but data suggest that most taxpayers are not zealots,
though all else equal, everyone prefers to pay less in taxes.290 Rather,
what voters may have objected to was what appeared to be govern-
ment subterfuge—the idea that these taxes were hidden and designed
to escape existing limitations.
While the same voters who want to make it harder for state and
local governments to raise taxes may also want to make it harder for
state and local governments to regulate behavior, the arguments for
restricting state and local authority in these two cases are different. In
the first case, voters may object to the quality of the services they are
getting in relation to the tax dollars they are paying. In the second,
they may object to the state’s obstruction into private activity. It is
possible, however, that the “double dividend” of Pigovian charges
would allow governments to lower other taxes and fees, as the
stormwater remediation fee did in Ithaca.291
Further, to the extent voters do not like these changes to common
law definitions of user fees, they can seek recourse in other popular
referenda or legislative champions at the state level in response to
state court changes to the doctrine. Until then, the courts must at-
tempt to define these terms for themselves.
Finally, I put forward this proposal mindful that there are fifty dif-
ferent state approaches to this issue. While my proposal may work in
some states, given the legislative and constitutional history of the
state and the political meaning of these distinctions, it may be more
difficult (or impossible) for judges in other states to adopt it, at least in
its entirety. Explicitly recognizing that governments impose user fees
for a wide variety of purposes should be a possibility in almost all
states and that step in and of itself would offer some clarity to the
doctrine.
290. See generally WILLIAMSON, supra note 31.
291. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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3. Measuring Externality Costs
A final and significant difficulty with this proposal is that it re-
quires courts to assess the government’s measurement of externality
costs. To the extent a government seeks to capture the double divi-
dend of Pigovian taxation while exercising that user fee authority, the
definition I propose requires that government’s pricing regulation to
reflect a true externality cost and that cost be the externality borne by
the specific geographic unit imposing the cost. Measuring such costs is
not a trivial matter.
Under the existing doctrinal framework, state courts currently
struggle—and sometimes stumble—in their efforts to assess the rela-
tionship between the economic benefit conferred on the payor and the
costs to the government providing that benefit. But at least such mea-
surements ostensibly relate to actual expenditures that the govern-
ment will make and that should be reflected in its capital expenditure
budget. Externality costs, in contrast, are necessarily speculative. As
Victor Fleischer suggests, such costs are often heterogeneous, that is,
there may be significant variation in the externality cost imposed by
two people engaging in the same behavior.292
As Darrien Shankse’s work has suggested, state courts might do
better to evaluate such questions procedurally rather than substan-
tively.293 Courts that are not adept at answering whether the price is
actually set correctly might still be able to identify flaws in a govern-
ment’s methodological approach. Did they consult the right experts?
Did they commission the right studies?
And, of course, all is not lost should courts decide that the govern-
ment’s methodology is not sufficient to support a conclusion that the
price matches the externality cost. Governments could then either im-
pose the price under their taxing authority or change their methodol-
ogy. Shanske persuasively argues that such a procedural review
would also provide more certain guidance to policymakers as they de-
sign policies to be implemented under their user fee authority.
Under my proposed two-pronged definition of price-based regula-
tory tools, a government can forgo measuring the externality and opt
instead to qualify a charge under the user fee doctrine by restricting
revenue to abatement costs. Courts, however, must then evaluate the
fit between the “abatement costs” identified by the government and
externality costs imposed by payor behavior. Such an inquiry may be
straightforward. In the case of stormwater remediation fees, fees are
dedicated to stormwater infrastructure, and so there is a clear link
between the user fee and the cost to the local government of abating
the water pollution. In the case of other charges, the government’s
292. See Fleischer, supra note 1.
293. See generally Shanske, supra note 26.
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abatement costs may be less clear. If the government uses revenue
from a carbon tax for infrastructure improvements necessitated by ris-
ing sea levels or to develop drought resistant water supplies, those
costs would strike most environmentalists as costs imposed by climate
change.294 But what if a government uses its carbon pricing revenue
to further reduce emissions, for example, by investing in less energy-
intensive infrastructure? Are those costs related to abating the exter-
nality? Or are those additional abatement opportunities?
And given the vogue of calling all social bads externalities,295
courts may also feel pressure to police the definition of externalities.
Public health officials often lament the externalities imposed by
sugar, for example, while many economists question the extent of the
social costs (as opposed to individual costs) imposed by the obesity epi-
demic.296 Such debates could open the door to more complexity in the
doctrine, as courts struggle to limit the definition of externality.
Though such an outcome is clearly possible, courts are up to this task,
and further, policing the limits of the definition of “externality” may
be significantly easier than policing the definition of user fee under
existing doctrine. After all, the definition of user fee is a pure legal
construct, and drawing a clearly defensible line between user fees and
taxes is all but impossible as a theoretical matter. The term external-
ity, on the other hand, is not a legal concept, but an economic one.
While measuring externality costs with precision may be difficult,
rough measurements should suffice in determining whether the exter-
nality is real or not.
As the discussion of various objections to my proposal reveals, cre-
ating clear lines between user fees and taxes is not easy. This proposal
does not completely eliminate the problems of current approaches, but
it does offer a way forward that should both simplify some definitional
questions and, at the very least, help courts clarify and grapple di-
rectly with why the line is difficult to draw.
V. CONCLUSION
State and local governments are increasingly interested in regulat-
ing through pricing and other market-based mechanisms. Such regu-
latory efforts will get caught in the thicket of judicial attempts to
294. I do not deal directly with the concerns of climate change skeptics. Rather, I as-
sume that a government willing to impose carbon pricing has an electorate will-
ing to believe that climate change is real.
295. See generally N. Gregory Mankiw, Can a Soda Tax Save Us from Ourselves?, N.Y.
TIMES (June 5, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/06/business/06
view.html; Pratt, supra note 169 (arguing that public health advocates focusing
on the cost of soda consumption are looking at both social costs (true externali-
ties) and internalities (individual costs that are borne at a future date)).
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distinguish taxes from user fees. Courts should reform the law in this
area by adopting definitions that more closely match the reasons state
law distinguishes between taxes and user fees. The proposal discussed
in this Article is one attempt to clarify this doctrine.
